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ABSTRACT
The Suez Crisis of 1956 was an unmitigated disaster for the United Kingdom.
For the vast majority of historians, it marks the effective downfall of the British Empire.
In reviewing the series of events preceding and throughout the crisis, it becomes evident
that the reason for the failure of the Suez expedition rests not on actions taken in Cairo or
Moscow, but in Washington. The efforts of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles
to stymie Anthony Eden from achieving his goals during the affair are the key factors to
the ruination of British efforts towards removing Gamal Abdel Nasser from power and
reversing his nationalization of the Suez Canal. By examining the Suez Crisis, much
light is shed on the true nature of Anglo-American diplomacy during the early Cold War
period; tense questions arise about the reality of the “special relationship” between the
United States and Great Britain. However, one fact remains certain, in the desert sands of
the Sinai Peninsula during November 1956, Britannia lost her Empire and America
asserted its dominance.
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CHAPTER I
A HEAVY PRICE FOR A DITCH
“The Suez Crisis was a Greek tragedy, entirely of American making from start to
finish.”1
Sir William Jackson, British general and historian
“Suez had many losers, and two clear victors – President Nasser and the Americans.”2
Mohamed Heikal, Egyptian journalist and advisor to Gamal Abdel Nasser
By 1956, the mandarins at the helm of an ever-shrinking empire viewed Egypt as
a lost world. Colored red on maps of British possessions around the globe since the
nineteenth century, this former protectorate of the crown was red no longer. Although
with the overthrow of its pro-British king in 1952, Egypt had technically broken free
from the sphere of influence of its former colonial overseer, lingering effects of empire
remained; under the auspices of the Anglo–Egyptian Agreement of 1954 the United
Kingdom’s presence persisted. However, its light dimmed with the shadows cast by over
80,000 British servicemen departing Egyptian soil. This impressive army once occupied
a base located on the Sinai Peninsula, near the Suez Canal at Ismailia. Called “the
greatest overseas military installation the world has ever known,” the base at Ismailia by
early summer 1956 was manned by only a single battalion.3 This final squad had the
distinct, but dubious, honor of being the last armed men to step foot from this former
bastion of imperial power. Their selection for this duty was not left to chance. The
regiment of grenadier guards was the direct descendent of the first battalion to land at

1

William Jackson, Withdrawal from Empire: A Military View (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1987), 145.
2
Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes (New
York: Arbor House, 1987), 201.
3
Osgood Caruthers, "British Quietly Give Suez Base to Egypt After 74-Year
Stay." New York Times, June 14, 1956. 1; Arthur Veysey, “Last of British Army in Egypt
Leaves Quietly,” The Chicago Tribune, April 1, 1956, 2
1

Port Said during the Anglo-Egyptian War.4 In 1882, these soldiers helped to secure
Egyptian obedience to the British Empire; now over seventy years later their posterities
participated in its eradication. There was no pomp or pageantry to mark the occasion of
these last remnants of British authority leaving this ancient land; they quietly stole away
in the middle of the night. By dawn of June 13, 1956, it was highly debatable if Britannia
still ruled the waves, but no longer a question that she had surrendered the ocean of desert
sands covering the pharaohs’ former dominion.5 However, if the hopes of men
occupying power in the corridors of White Hall were realized, not for long.6
One Gamal Abdel Nasser held very different hopes. Born into a working-class
family during the waning months of World War I, Nasser joined the army at the age of
nineteen.7 Rising quickly up the ranks in the Egyptian military, Nasser, in view of his
contemporaries, was a man on the move. Sixteen years later, at age 36, he became the de
facto leader of his nation.8 For Nasser, it was only the start. By 1956, the young
Egyptian president had become a constant thorn in the side of British interests throughout
the Middle East. Since seizing power, Nasser sought to engender and export the spirits of
anti-colonialism and pan-Arabism across the region. By rejecting Western defense
treaties, destabilizing pro-British regimes, and inflaming Arab masses, it was working.
But in the summer of that year he hit a snag. Starting in 1955, Nasser gambled much of
his nation’s prestige on the construction of the Aswan Dam. Through this massive
infrastructure project, he hoped to display the growing power of Egypt under his

4

Arthur Veysey, “Last of British Army in Egypt Leaves Quietly,” Chicago
Tribune, April 1, 1956, 2.
5
Osgood Caruthers, "British Quietly Give Suez Base to Egypt After 74-Year
Stay," New York Times, June 14, 1956. 1.
6
Remembering the initial phase of the Suez Crisis, prominent Conservative MP,
Julian Amery, states, “Plainly the great issue has arisen. I thought that withdrawal from
the Canal Zone had been potentially fatal to the unity of the Commonwealth. Was there
not any opportunity to retrieve it? I was convinced there was. And if we pressed an
attack against Egypt, political if possible but military if necessary, we could recover the
ground that had been lost.” Quoted in Channel Four, End of Empire: Egypt (1985).
7
Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956 (New York: Harper &
Row, 1978), 54.
8
Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004),
55.
2

nationalist reign. 9 To fund this expensive endeavor significant sources of foreign
investment were required. Eager to gain Nasser as an ally against the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United States pledged to underwrite a hefty amount of the dam’s
cost. However, when Nasser sought to garner Soviet financial aid as well, the American
government abruptly rescinded their offer.10 Left in a lurch, with the entire world
watching, Nasser contemplated his next move. On July 22, 1956, three days after the
American action, a close friend of Nasser proposed gaining increased revenue for the
Aswan Dam by renegotiating the fees of the usage of the Suez Canal with the British
foreign minister.11 Nasser’s confidant argued that the British government might be
convinced to up Egypt’s share of the canal’s revenue to 50 percent. Nasser, never one to
dream small, responded, “Why fifty-fifty, why not a hundred percent? Why is [that] too
much?”12 The advisor did not have a response, but Anthony Eden certainly did.
With the advent of the 1950s, the euphoria of victory over Imperial Japan and
Nazi Germany had effectively worn off in the United States. To the vast majority of
Americans, the specter of a totalitarian menace still endangered the entire world. The
threat of international communism, embodied by the U.S.S.R, became an overriding
factor affecting both the external diplomacy and domestic politics of the nation. Locked
into an increasingly complex global chess match with the Soviet Union, the foreign
policy of the U.S. began to deviate more and more from those of its traditional allies of
Britain and France. Efficiently preventing the spread of communism became the litmus
test of all American actions abroad. In regards to Anglo-American relations, the key
point of contention was not the succinct goal but the rudimentary means. Britain,
founded as an imperial power, viewed the continuation of her Empire -- albeit in a more
benign and informal arrangement -- as an effective rampart against the spread of
communist expansion. In turn, the Americans saw it only as an antiquated albatross that
actually increased the appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the third world.
9

William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981
(Albany: State University of New York, 1985), 40.
10
Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the
Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 47.
11
Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, xiv.
12
Ibid.
3

The U.S. policymakers believed a third-way of nationalism (opposed to the binary choice
of colonialism or communism) constituted the effective means of successfully halting
Soviet influence around the globe. In late 1955, these conflicting British and American
ideas, gestating under the surface since the beginning of the Cold War, came to a head
when the U.S. formally declined to join the Bagdad Pact.13 Officially known as the
Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) and nominally led by Great Britain, the Pact
was a collective security alliance formed to deter Soviet expansion into the near east.
The Eisenhower administration initially supported its proposed formation
enthusiastically.14 However, the U.S. soon soured on the idea after many in the Arab
world began claiming that METO was only a cover for the continuation of Western
imperial rule over its regional member nations. METO’s fiercest critic was none other
than Gamal Abdel Nasser.15 Fearful of offending Nasser and escalating anti-American
sentiment in the region, the U.S., to the chagrin of its faithful British ally, refused to join
the organization it had until recently actively promoted. By the dawning of 1956, this
perfidy of American support toward the U.K. still perplexed British leaders, although it
really should not have. The United States was neither pro-Britain nor pro-Egypt; it was
solely first and foremost pro-America.16
For eight days in the fall of 1956, these forces -- British, American, and Egyptian
interests -- battled it out upon the public stage of international affairs with the rest of the
world watching. Although other nations were caught up in the conflict, the stakes stood
highest for these three. Egypt faced a return to de facto colonial rule, America the loss of
goodwill in the developing world, and Great Britain the final demise of its empire. When
the smoke settled over the battlefields and the sound and fury ceased on the diplomatic
scenes, the victors and vanquished were apparent to all. In this transnational high-stakes
poker game over the Suez Canal, Britannia came out flushed. Her luck was up and the
chips were gone.
13

Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 31.
14
Ibid.
15
Yaqub, 38.
16
John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special
Relationship, 1940-57 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 269.
4

After 1956, Suez symbolized more to the British citizenry than a location in
Egypt. In that year, it ignominiously fell into the category of words for localities that
signified much, much more. For the British people this was not a new concept.
Throughout the early twentieth century, many others had been added to the lexicon of
their collective conscious. The Somme, Gallipoli, Munich, Dunkirk, and Yalta all come
to mind. The mere mention of these points on a map engender images and concepts -some virtuous, others shameful -- that leave little doubt that during a specific point of
time the course of history had been redirected there, for good or ill. In 1956, Suez
became such a place. One can find a fitting example of this transformation in the James
Clavell novel Noble House (1981). Set in the colony of Hong Kong during the 1960s,
Clavell’s work focuses on a British expatriate attempting to fend off a hostile takeover of
his investment bank by an American. One character mentions “Suez “to a colleague and
receives a visceral reaction. “Oh! You mean the 1956 fiasco when Eisenhower betrayed
us and caused the failure of the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt -- because Nasser
had nationalized the canal?”17 Although the conversation is pure fiction, the sentiment,
held in various forms on both sides of the Atlantic, and the accuracy of the facts are not
far off the mark.18 While to term the refusal of Dwight Eisenhower to commit the United
States into supporting the Suez expedition as a “betrayal” of the United Kingdom can be
chalked up as hyperbolic rhetoric, the endeavor’s success nevertheless did hinge on that
critical decision. For ultimately the fate of Anthony Eden’s gambit would not be won or
lost by bullets, tanks, and planes in the Egyptian desert but rested on world opinion,
global financial markets, and geopolitics. On these asymmetrical fields of battle, Eden

17

James Clavell, Noble House (New York: Delacorte Press, 1981), 191.
Eisenhower’s own vice-president even became convinced this was true.
Writing in his memoirs Richard Nixon states: “Eisenhower and Dulles put heavy public
pressure on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their forces from Suez. In retrospect I
believe that our actions were a serious mistake. Nasser became even more rash and
aggressive than before, and the seeds of another Mideast war were planted. The most
tragic result was that Britain and France were so humiliated and discouraged by the Suez
crisis that they lost the will to play a major role on the world scene. From this time
forward the United States would by necessity be forced to ‘go it alone’ in the foreign
policy leadership of the free world.” Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard
Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 179.
18

5

needed United States support. It was essential, yet did not materialize. Thus, the
breakdown of Anglo-American diplomacy during the Suez Crisis resulted in the failure of
the British government to achieve its primary aims of removing Egyptian President
Nasser from power and reversing his nationalization of the Suez Canal.
It should have been evident that American consent was essential for any
intervention into Egypt by Great Britain and her allies to succeed. Yet during the days
and months leading up to the action, the United States consistently expressed its
disapproval of a military solution for the Suez crisis. However, the British disregarded
these strident messages from the Eisenhower administration and instead chose to collude
with France and Israel in ridding themselves of their collective nemesis -- Nasser.
Shortly after this tacit agreement, on October 29, Israeli shock troops poured over the
Egyptian border igniting the conflict.19 Two days later Britain joined the fray with RAF
pilots raining fire down upon parts of Cairo.20 By the end of the first week of November,
British and French forces had already partially seized control of the Suez Canal, while
Israeli tanks raced across the Sinai Peninsula chasing remnants of the routed Egyptian
army. As military operations went, the joint British-French-Israeli assault could not have
gone better.21 Resistance was minimal, timetables met, and casualties light; in the fog of
war little more could be asked. However, on November 6, without consulting either her
French or Israeli allies, Britannia folded. Or, more specifically, Anthony Eden declared a
cease-fire to hostilities that would commence at midnight.22 An observer could question
why, so close to victory but without any of its true objectives accomplished, the British
government called it quits. Although it was a bitter pill to swallow, the reason was
obvious. The next day Eden conceded the cruel truth: “It is clear we cannot now carry

19

Brian Lapping, End of Empire (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), 273.
Geoffrey Carter, Crises Do Happen: The Royal Navy and Operation Musketeer,
Suez 1956 (Lodge Hill, United Kingdom: Maritime, 2006), 27.
21
Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: Abacus
History, 2012), 313.
22
Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London: Jonathan Cape, 1978),
211.
20

6

this through alone with the French. We must now get U.S. support.”23 Prior to this mea
culpa realization by the U.K. prime minister, the Americans made it abundantly apparent
that this “help” for its faithful ally would come at a steep price. And if the British needed
some reminding, the Eisenhower administration gave them some less than subtle hints.
As the crisis unfolded the United States denounced Britain in the United Nations as an
aggressor, harassed and threatened its naval forces, and most importantly withheld crucial
financial support as the U.K teetered on the economic brink.24 The American price, in
not so many words, was quite simple: the end of British intervention in Egypt. In
keeping with their famous stiff-upper-lip forbearance, the Brits paid in full.
The repercussions of Suez were numerous and significant; they reverberated like
earthquakes across the world. Future events, like aftershocks, were shaped and molded
by its occurrence. Foremost of these was the ruin of Anthony Eden. First went his
physical health, shortly after his political premiership. Although he had been plagued
with bouts of illness since a botched gall-bladder operation in the early 1950s, during the
duration of the crisis Eden’s wellbeing dramatically declined to such an extent that he
was confined to bed by mid-November. By early January 1957, in what many consider
an American-supported palace coup orchestrated by members of his own party, he
resigned as prime minister.25 Eden always defended his actions during Suez, stating

23

Scott W. Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 295; Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the
Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 162.
24
In regards to American financial pressure on Britain during the crisis, some
historians hold a much more Machiavellian view of Eisenhower’s role. David Watry
argues: “During the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower secretly declared an all-out economic war
against Great Britain. He initiated a highly successful speculative financial attack on the
value of sterling, which threatened to completely destabilize the British monetary system
and economy. Herbert Hoover Jr., an expert at international finance, recommended the
very arcane and elaborate strategy of the Federal Reserve quickly dumping their sterling
holdings at basement prices, launching an attack on Britain’s currency. Eisenhower
played political and economic hardball to compel the British to withdraw from Suez.”
David M. Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold
War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UP, 2014), 138.
25
On American involvement, reporter Donald Neff writes, “Though the messages
on the secret negotiations between Aldrich and the leadership of the Tory Party remain
classified by the government. Transcripts of Eisenhower’s telephone conversations make
7

shortly after the crisis that he was “convinced, more convinced that I have been about
anything in my public life, that we were right, my colleagues and I, in the judgments and
decisions we took, and that history will prove it so.”26 He never wavered from this
declaration. However, as acclaimed historian Peter Hennessy succinctly puts it, “History
has let Eden down.”27 In modern times Sir Anthony Eden is consistently regarded by both
the British general public and academics as one of the “worst” prime ministers of the
twentieth century.28 When reasons are inevitably cited for this dubious ranking, the word
Suez both dominates and encapsulates that particular list.
In contrasting fashion, Eden’s primary antagonist, Gamal Abdel Nasser, emerged
from the crisis hailed as an Egyptian national hero and a champion against Western
imperialism around the world. His armies beaten on the battlefield, his nation invaded,
and his capital bombed, Nasser nevertheless “won” the war. Remaining as leader of
Egypt until his death in 1970, he continued to plague his Suez adversaries throughout the
Middle East during the 1960s. His initiatives included aiding insurgents against British
influence in Aden (Oman) and French governance in Algeria, while once again engaging
in open conflict with Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War. During the remainder of his
rule, Nasser made it a point to settle the accounts of 1956. Although despised by the
leadership of the other Arab states, with the notable exception of Syria, Nasser remained
beloved by their masses until his death. Today, even in the twenty-first century,
it clear that the Conservative leaders and the Eisenhower Administration now began a
secret collusion of their own. Its purpose was to keep the Conservative government in
power in Britain. It amounted to a highly unethical meddling in Britain’s domestic
affairs by Eisenhower.” Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into
the Middle East (New York: Linden/Simon and Schuster, 1981), 425.
26
Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 222.
27
Peter Hennessy, Having it so Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Penguin,
2007), 406.
28
Andrew Hough, “Gordon Brown 'Third Worst PM Since 1945', Poll of
Historians Finds,” The Telegraph, August 3, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/7923790/Gordon-Brown-third-worst-PM-since1945-poll-of-historians-finds.html (accessed August 18, 2015); “Thatcher and Attlee Top
PM List,” BBC News, August 29, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5294024.stm (accessed August 18, 2015);
“Churchill 'greatest PM of 20th Century,’” BBC News, January 4, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/575219.stm (accessed August 18, 2015).
8

countless denizens of the Near East celebrate him as a vanquisher of colonialism, fighter
of Zionism, and father of Pan Arabism; with much of this sustained admiration coming
from reverence for his perceived 1956 victory. Myths, like perceptions, die -- if they ever
truly do -- hard.
For America the spoils/consequences of Suez was its continued presence in
Middle Eastern affairs. After the crisis, as the British lion stumbled off to lick its
wounds, it fell to the United States to take up the mantle for Western interests in the
region. This fomented a role that is yet to be relinquished. In the afterglow of the British
humiliation over Egypt, goodwill toward the Eisenhower Administration abounded
throughout the Arab world. Pro-American sentiment filled the streets, and praise
reverberated toward the U.S. president who was exalted for his “principles” and his
“noble attitude in support of right and justice.”29 In no uncertain terms this euphoria
came from only one specific exploit: the United States’ role in halting British and Israeli
aims during Suez.

For the applause turned out to be ephemeral; less than a year later

things began to sour. Nine months after Suez, unrest in Syria brought threats of
American intervention, then by 1958 over 10,000 U.S. soldiers waded into the morass of
a chaotic Lebanese civil war.30 By these actions -- and numerous more to follow -- many
in the Arab world came to believe that the United States had simply replaced a waning
Britannia as their would be colonial master; in coming years chants of “death to
America” and burning “Old Glory” became ubiquitous on street corners dotting the Arab
world.31 While Eisenhower’s actions at Suez, taking America into the heart of Middle
Eastern concerns, are now over sixty years old, the repercussions of those decisions still
linger.
29

Yaqub, 65.
Dana Adam Schmidt, "Eisenhower says Soviet Objective is to Rule Syria,”
New York Times, August 22, 1957, 1; W. H. Lawrence, "U.S. Reinforcements Arrive in
Lebanon," New York Times, August 2, 1958, 1.
31
This interpretation of Arab fury over American foreign policy supports Edward
Said’s arguments on the subject, laid out in his work Orientalism (1979), as opposed to
the ones contended by his academic rival, Bernard Lewis, that are prominently featured
in Lewis’ 1990 Atlantic Monthly article “Roots of Muslim Rage.” See Edward W. Said,
Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979); Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim
Rage," The Atlantic, September 1990, 17-26.
30

9

Many Anglophiles might find it as tempting now, as many Britons did in the late
1950s, to compartmentalize the failure of the Suez expedition into a personal one of
Anthony Eden’s own creation. The harsh truth is, although Eden’s fate might perfectly
personify the results of the crisis, Suez left an indelible black mark on Great Britain’s
reputation as a global force, which no amount of whitewashing ever removed. Two
dominant, but competing, schools of thought in British history both interpret the failed
1956 invasion of Egypt as the death knell for the empire and a turning point of the
nation.32 The first, as Dominic Sandbrook asserts, views this watershed moment as
forming a signpost highlighting the declining fortunes of the country. “The symbolic
importance of the crisis,” he declares, “was that it marked a confrontation between the
old ambitions of British imperialism and the new realities of post imperial retrenchment.
Indeed, the Suez affair illustrated with striking clarity the decline of British imperial
power.”33 He goes on to write, “It was not, as some people tend to imagine, a cause of
that decline; rather, it was a reflection of Britain’s changed role in the world, partly as a
result of two ruinously expensive global wars.”34 He closes with, “In fact, British
imperial power had been ebbing for decades. Suez simply demonstrated it, powerfully
and incontrovertibly, to the entire world.”35 In essence, Sandbrook and other historians of
this inclination maintain that Suez pulled back the curtain shrouding the British Empire
thereby exposing its failing nature for all to see.
32

A third, but not widely-held reading of the post-World War II British Empire
postulates Suez was merely a momentary hindrance towards the deliberate transformation
of the United Kingdom’s global influence from hard to soft power. This theory holds
Suez was in large part simply a personal failure for Eden alone. As professor Benjamin
Grob-Fitzgibbon explains: “From 1948 to the mid-1960s, the British government did not
abandon its imperial mission. Rather it reshaped that mission to better facilitate the
conditions of the postwar world. Correctly recognizing that the age of national selfdetermination and self-government was upon it, and cognizant of the bipolarity of the
Cold War environment, the government evolved its strategy to preference the devolution
of power to indigenous peoples over the autocratic practice of that power.” Benjamin
Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire
(Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 376.
33
Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had It so Good: A History of Britain from Suez to
the Beatles (London: Abacus, 2005), 27.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
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The second theory holds that the crisis itself is, in fact, the catalyst that brought
Britain as a world power to its knees. Although not an adherent of this model, Niall
Ferguson makes the very real point that the fiasco at Suez “sent a signal to nationalists
throughout the British Empire: the hour of freedom had struck. But the hour was chosen
by the Americans, not by the nationalists.”36 Sir William Jackson argues that before
Suez, “Britain’s attempt to rebuild her post-war position in the world using the idiom of
the Commonwealth rather than Empire seemed to be succeeding.”37 He goes on to make
clear that through failing to meet her objectives during Suez, Britannia had no choice but
to, “abandon her attempt to regain superpower status in the post-war world and begin the
final phases of her withdrawal from Empire.”38 Finally, while these two schools of
British historical thought might differ on the actual meaning of the Suez affair, both agree
that its ultimate result upon the United Kingdom remains the same; namely, that the
nation was left in a much weaker position in its foreign affairs -- and in the world at-large
-- after the crisis than before it.
To comprehend clearly the American and British choices resulting in the Suez
affair much groundwork is required. These fateful decisions, conceived not in a timeless
vacuum, are the accumulation of a long and curious history of Anglo-American relations.
By examining this connection, especially during the post-World War II era of the “special
relationship,” the rationale directing the leadership in these nations, during the fall of
1956, starts to crystalize. While context does not fully explain the diplomatic breakdown
between the two allies, it is essential in paving the way for a balanced explanation. This
trip down memory lane illustrates that the rift between the U.S. and the U.K. over British
objectives during Suez should not have come as much of a surprise as it did to the
Conservative government of Anthony Eden.
Also required in fully grasping the failure of British policy during Suez is an
understanding of what Eden sought to achieve through his thinly veiled invasion of
Egypt. Here, again, significant context is required. Great Britain’s involvement in the
36

Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and
the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 297.
37
Jackson, 125.
38
Ibid., 167.
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domestic affairs of Egypt antedated Suez by over eighty years. During this long and
contentious association, violence dotted Anglo-Egyptian relations, sowing the rancorous
seeds that eventually blossomed into open warfare between the two parties by 1956.
Likewise, another key to understanding this turn of events is the personal relationship
between Anthony Eden and Gamal Abdel Nasser. For their actions more than any others
brought the crisis to fruition. By examining these two facets of the past, British goals
during Suez, of removing Nasser from power and reclaiming the Suez Canal, become
manifest.
Finally, the mere recounting of the Suez affair -- from Nasser’s July 26
nationalization of the canal to the final withdrawal of British forces on December 22 -demonstrates that the Eisenhower Administration sought a very different path to
resolving the crisis than did the British government. And this disagreement between the
United States and Britain over Suez is what wrought failure and humiliation upon
Anthony Eden and his nation. Through the narrating of events over this six-month period,
Eden’s fateful choice to misread, mitigate, and ultimately disregard American objections
to a military solution in response to Nasser’s action becomes obvious. Although the time
period is short, much transpired in these days and nights that made lasting history.
Unpacking these events is simple, but not easy. However, no squabbles over definitions
of words, no existential interpretations of occurrences, and no high drawn-out
metaphysical search for hidden agency will be necessary here. Simply put this is a tale
that requires no equivocation.
In 1855, Ferdinand de Lesseps traveled to London to meet with members of the
British government. This French diplomat and visionary needed financial investors for
an independent company to pursue his dream of transfiguring ocean travel. De Lesseps
approached Lord Palmerston, then prime minister, with an audacious plan to carve out a
canal from the desert sands covering the Sinai Peninsula.39 When reviewing de Lesseps’
proposal the British government declared that he was asking for “a heavy price for a
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ditch.”40 He went home empty handed, but future British leaders would rue this
shortsighted mistake made by their predecessor. For after its completion, the incalculable
benefit of the Suez Canal became apparent to all. Even to the most obstinate Englishman.
In essence, this new waterway had made the world smaller. A little over a hundred years
later, the name “Ferdinand de Lesseps” and the ownership of that “ditch” would again
come to infuriate a British. On July 26 1956, during a radio address ostensibly decrying
Western colonialism, Nasser repeated the Frenchman’s name over fourteen times.41 It
was pointless overkill. The Egyptian troops, waiting for that specific code word, started
storming the offices of the Anglo-Franco controlled Suez Company after its initial
utterance. Thus began the Suez Crisis, which ultimately cost the British Empire more
than it ever bargained for over that particular ditch. Ironically, this heavy price is due, in
large part, to the actions of one of its former colonies and its closest allies – the United
States.
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CHAPTER II
GREEKS IN AN AGE OF ROMANS
“We have to maintain our position as an Empire and a Commonwealth. If we fail to do
so we cannot exist as a world power.”42
-Anthony Eden, 1942
“One thing we are sure we are not fighting for is to hold the British Empire together. We
don’t like to put the matter so bluntly, but we don’t want you to have any illusions. If
your strategists are planning a war to hold the British Empire together they will sooner or
later find themselves strategizing alone.”43
-From an open letter to the people of England by the editors of Life magazine, October
1942
As the old adage goes, when the chips are truly down, families -- even extended
ones -- stick together. Such was the case upon the faraway waters of the Pei-ho River in
China on June 25, 1859. During the Second Anglo-Chinese War, an attachment of Royal
Navy gunboats assaulting the Taku Forts, which guarded the strategic tributary, literally
found themselves in dire straits. Quickly pinned down by preternaturally accurate
artillery fire from these Chinese fortifications, the ensnared forces suffered heavy
casualties and faced utter annihilation.44 In the midst of this chaos, a second barge of
armed vessels wrecklessly entered the fray. These newly arrived gunboats of the United
States Navy, commanded by Commodore Josiah Tattnall, began rescuing British sailors
while also joining in their fight against the Chinese.45 The episode marked the first time
American and British troops fought, not as adversaries, but as brothers in arms. By
disobeying strict orders to maintain U.S. neutrality, the Commodore became, on both
sides of the Atlantic, an immediate folk hero for his perceived gallant action. He
garnered even more acclaim with his response to superiors who demanded an explanation
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for why he violated a direct command not to get involved in the conflict. Tattnall’s
simple justification has never left the English-language lexicon. He plainly wrote, “Blood
is thicker than water.”46
During the tumultuous days of November 1956, Anthony Eden banked his
nation’s fortunes on the conviction that Dwight Eisenhower would make the same
magnanimous decision that Commodore Tattnall did a century earlier. Casting aside all
his anti-colonial sentiments, discounting the counsel of his Anglophobic advisors, and
screwing his courage to the sticking place, the American president would ultimately do
the “honorable” thing. Any cursory glance at the communal history of American and
Britain relationships of the early 20th century could reasonably give one such hope. For
is it not true that through the flames of two world wars and the emergence of a new
colder one, they had alway stood rigidly together? Steadfast in the defense of democracy,
liberty, and decency, these international powers would support their English-speaking
counterpart. However, this supposition of the British prime minister, also held by many
others, was constructed on a false and romanticized narrative.
Suez stands as a testament to a harsh and fundamental truth: self-interest, not
sentimental bonds of brotherhood, forge the fires that fuel international relations.
Although noble and altruistic actions did and do occur between nations, they are sadly the
exceptions to this axiom. The Anglo-American relationship, considered from the dawn
of the twentieth century until 1955, holds fewer of these magnanimous allowances than a
casual observer might reasonably expect. In fact, if past interactions by these two nations
were indicative of future exchanges, the American obstruction of British aims during the
Suez Crisis seems quite predictable. To say the least, from the perspective of Great
Britain’s policymakers in the waning months of 1956 -- notably one Anthony Eden -- it
was anything but. As lessons go, it proved a harsh and unrelenting one. This necessary
revisionist lesson of Anglo-American diplomacy, foreshadowing and contributing to
decisions made at Suez, divides nicely into two unique chronicles. As with so many
other attempts at periodization, here a war’s bloody conclusion works suitably to separate
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the shepherding narratives. The first, 1890s until the end of World War II, lays the
foundation of the myth Eden found so falsely reassuring; the second, from 1945 until
Suez, exposes the widening cracks -- which British policymakers should have found
evident -- between the two English-speaking allies that left Great Britain’s national
stature tumbling into a sinking abyss during November 1956.
Long before Winston Churchill ever uttered the term “Special Relationship” on a
tiny college campus in the spring of 1946, there first came the Great Rapprochement.
During much of the 19th century, the exploits of an American commodore on a river in
China notwithstanding, dealings between the two Atlantic powers were fraught with
tension. Marked by numerous international incidents since open hostilities formally
ended with the cessation of the War of 1812, the former colony and its mother country
stayed on shaky ground, diplomatically speaking. Through a succession of uneasy and
taut engagements, this frosty relationship looked to spark into fiery conflict on more than
one occasion. The most notable of these episodes were the Caroline Affair (1837), the
grossly misnamed Aroostook War (1839), the Oregon Question (1848), the Trent Affair
(1861), the Fenian Raids (1866 and 1871), and the Venezuelan Crisis (1895).47 The list
goes on; yet, these above-named crises stand out due to the fact war between the United
States and Great Britain stood as a real, feasible, and at times likely outcome each.
Laying general blame solely on one side for these potential casus belli is difficult.
However, a number of historians make the case that an arriviste America could fit the bill
as the provocateur in most cases.48 By 1895, open combat would finally settle hostile
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tensions between the two nations; although it was another aged empire, thankfully not
Britain, which the American eagle furiously lashed it talons out at that brought about the
accommodation.
One telling encounter during the Spanish-American War cannot roughly illustrate
or explain fifty years of Anglo-American cooperation, but it is a good start. When the
U.S. went to war with Spain in 1898, primarily over Cuba, European solidarity for the
Spanish cause stood universal except in Albion.49 Although technically neutral, Britannia
made her pro-American sympathies perfectly clear: “within hours of the news that the
United States had declared war thousands of red, white, and blue streamers decked
buildings in London and the British press came out enthusiastically on the American
side.”50 Here, with the fervent flag waving by Englanders for their Atlantic cousins,
many chroniclers attest the Great Rapprochement began; yet its true formation, from a
strategic sense, took place thousands of miles away at a contested harbor on the Pacific
Ocean.
For even after his one-sided victory over the Spanish on May 1, 1898, George
Dewey’s dominance over Manila Bay remained contested.51 By June of that year, events
found him facing down another potential hostile fleet.52 Sailing into the harbor were
three men-of-war battleships of the German East Asia squadron, with their commanding
officer bellowing to a worried Dewey that, “I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir!”53 This
troublesome development seemed to confirm rumors that Germany sought to add the
Philippines onto its increasing list of recent colonial possessions. Dewey, taking the
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threat seriously, declared to a German Flag-Lieutenant, “If Germany wants war, all right,
we are ready.”54 As both sides positioned their fleets for a prospective battle, the ships of
other foreign nations wisely sailed out of range. All except the British contingent, who
situated themselves squarely alongside the Americans, guns ready. On August 14, the
outnumbered German ships peacefully left the harbor and sailed on their way, easing the
rising tensions between the three nations.55 In both the U.S. and the U.K., the press
celebrated their nations’ collective success in stymieing the efforts of an aggressive
power.56 Through this little-known episode of collaboration between two homogeneous
groups against a threatening, “other” comes the direct basis of the Anglo-American
cooperation that existed until the end of 1945.
German militarism, early Russian Bolshevism, Japanese imperialism, and Nazi
fascism made the U.S. and Britain easy international allies when circumstances
demanded. Combined with Otto Von Bismarck’s insightful observation of both nations
speaking a common language, other factors contributed to this “natural” alliance when
facing global and regional dangers to their shared interests. A common heritage focusing
on democratic values, mutually beneficial trade and commerce, and power structures in
both countries based around similar WASP elites aided as well. The advent of more
modern technology quickening potential military threats from hostile powers, rising
nationalist fervor in Europe and Asia, and an increased desire to safeguard international
trade gave policymakers, on both sides of the Atlantic, caused to parlay these similarities
into an informal alliance of their respective nations on various occasions. However, only
when both Americans and Britons found it advantageous to their distinct goal(s) did this
bonding of Anglo-American unity take place. Furthermore, even when the two nations
did agree upon reasons for a casus foederis (case for alliance) disagreements still arose
plaguing the diplomatic connections of the two powers. Though others exist, the major

54

"Germany at Manila," New York Times, July 06, 1898, 6; Thomas A. Bailey,
“Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay,” American Historical Review, volume. 45, No.
1 (Oct., 1939), 67.
55
Bailey, 78.
56
"The Expansion of Germany," New York Times, July 17, 1898. 16,
18

case in point of this trend of complex interactions between the United States and Great
Britain is their resulting relationship after the First World War.
Although speaking about a different situation in an earlier century, Lord
Palmerston’s telling remark about nations having only permanent interests and not
permanent allies could easily sum up the Anglo-American relationship after World War I.
Arising again in 1917, as it did in Manila Bay during the summer of 1898, unwise foreign
policy initiatives by Kaiser Wilhelm II resulted in American-British cooperation against
the German military. On April 2, antagonized by the reveal of the now infamous
Zimmerman telegram and by the desperate decision of the German navy to conduct
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, the United States joined the FrancoBritish efforts against the Kaiser’s Empire.57 Soon afterwards, and not for the last time in
the twentieth century, forces from the New World belatedly marshaled over the sea to
save the Old. With victory achieved against the Central Powers by November 1918, the
Anglo-American bond -- generated through their collective wartime struggle against a
common enemy -- evaporated like the mid-morning mist. Fundamental disputes arose
between the two allies that, “exacerbated tensions in their economic dealings; brought
into question the reliability of the USA as a long-term friend; posed difficult questions
about the future world order [and] brought Anglo-American naval rivalry into sharper
focus.”58 Adding to these divisions one must include disagreements over war
reparations, loan repayments, collective security arrangements, and finally Woodrow
Wilson’s attempt to remake the world in America’s image through the implementation of
his Fourteen Points.59 For these numerous reasons by the 1920s, with the specter of a
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joint international menace long vanished, images of Uncle Sam and Britannia walking
with arms interlocked faded into memory. See Figure One.

Figure 1: Poster with artwork by famed American illustrator James Montgomery
Flagg. Created by American Lithographic Co. N.Y. in 1918.
Source: Uncle Sam with Britannia. Digital image. Son of the South. Accessed
April 9, 2016. www.sonofthesouth.net.
way of thinking.’” Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999),
329.
20

Replacing this imagery was military leaders occupying smoke-filled offices
located in London and Washington dusting off and updating contingency plans for
possible war between the two nations.60 Although the chance of armed conflict between
the United States and the United Kingdom never stood as a realistic likelihood during
these inter-war years, it remained a possibility.61 As Winston Churchill adroitly
pronounced in 1927, while it was, “quite right in the interest of peace to go on talking
about war with the United States being ‘unthinkable,’ everyone knows this is not true.”62
Thankfully, in the mid-to-late-1930s, these tensions in the English-speaking world
abated; differing political and economic circumstances pointed American and British
politicians’ focus in opposing -- yet not antagonistic -- directions. Mired in the
seemingly everlasting financial downturn of the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s
administration concentrated its efforts inward, concerned chiefly with improving the
nation’s domestic situation.63 Dissimilarity, the curious and ominous actions of a failed
Austrian artist turned German dictator increasingly held the rapt attention of public
officials at Westminster. However, by the early fall of 1939, regardless of wanted
inclinations by British and American leaders, neither the White House nor Downing
Street could help but watch Europe igniting with the first sparks of war.
Arising to the forefront on the stage of history during this dark hour for humanity
strode Anthony Eden. Serving as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the
governments of both Stanley Baldwin and his successor Neville Chamberlain, Eden,
earlier than most, foresaw the menacing presence that a Germany ruled by Adolf Hitler
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offered the world.64 Unlike numerous of his compatriots and many members of his own
Conservative party, he refused to see the Third Reich as a lesser evil than the Soviet
Union, or agree that German Nazism stood as an acceptable counterbalance to Russian
Bolshevism. Resigning his cabinet position in 1938 over Chamberlain’s appeasement
policies, events soon vindicated Eden’s earlier warnings when Winton Churchill
reappointed Eden to his old post of Foreign Secretary in 1940.65 While Eden’s strong
sentiments against appeasing dictators would directly contribute to his thoughts and
actions during the Suez Crisis sixteen years later, a telling moment during these earlier
war years seemed to escape his memory in November 1956. For although Eden was as
an active participant during the events of World War II, it must be recognized he also
stood in the forefront as a first-hand observer.
The dawning of May 13, 1940 saw France quickly collapsing before the Nazis
war machine and with it a likely invasion of England looming.66 Nevertheless, on that
date at a meeting of the War Cabinet, Winston Churchill imparted a blood oath roundly
embraced by the British citizenry and their dominion kinsmen to fight to the death against
the seemingly unstoppable forces of Hitler’s Germany. “If this long island story of ours is
to end at last,” Churchill defiantly maintained, “let it end only when each one of us lies
choking in his own blood upon the grounds.”67 The horrible prospect of utter defeat for
the United Kingdom never stood as a starker and real probability than during the months
of that followed that poetic utterance; the crisis over Suez hardly ranks in the same
category. Faced with the possibilities of subjugation and national annihilation the British
Isles remained alone in its most critical time of need, aided only by its loyal Empire.
With the United States unwilling to rush urgently to safeguard Britain’s very survival
during this calamitous timespan, it is hard to believe any observer -- Anthony Eden
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included most of all -- should have expected American support during the Suez Crisis as
a foregone conclusion.
Only with a direct Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, accompanied by Hitler’s
foolhardy declaration of war on the United States three days later, did America finally
join Britain’s deadly struggle against the Axis powers.68 United again as allies in the
fight against common enemies, the U.S. and U.K. had more than sufficient reasons to put
away past disagreements; but they did not. The British concept and practice of empire
lay at the center of an ongoing dispute between the two English-speaking powers.
Starting with FDR’s thrusting of the Atlantic Charter upon Churchill in August 1941,
Roosevelt and his administration seized every opportunity to decry and criticize the
British maintenance of their colonial possessions.69
Harkening back to sentiments expressed at its inception, the United States never
viewed the Britons’ custom of acquiring and maintaining imperial holdings in high regard
or even as moral. This disdain only strengthened in the early twentieth century with
Woodrow Wilson’s quixotic crusade to make the world “safe for democracy” and to
promote self-determination of peoples around the globe -- philosophies most Americans
found antithetical to the concept of empire. However, unlike during the Great War when
British and American economic and military strengths were more equipotential, during
World War II the United States as the more dominant power pressured its now-unequal
confederate to cede to its demands. Ruffling major feathers on the part of the British
leadership, this American criticism of internal policies of the United Kingdom came as an
unwelcome corollary to critical military and financial aid the U.S. provided to the
ongoing war effort.70 Churchill and Eden maintained the continued possession of the
Empire and the status of Great Britain as a world power were nonnegotiable in a postwar
68
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world -- no matter how their closest ally viewed things.71 Strongly reiterating this
opinion near the end of the war on New Year’s Eve 1944, Churchill wrote:
There must be no question of our being hustled or seduced into declarations
affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or Colonies. Pray
remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire. If the
Americans want to take Japanese islands which they have conquered, let them do
so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them. But
‘Hands off the British Empire’ is our maxim and it must not be weakened or
smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.72
Other voices of a more malleable -- and perchance realistic -- tone did exist regarding the
increasingly transforming Anglo-American relationship during the war.
These forward-thinking English adherents held the question: if the United States
could aggressively persuade the liquidation of the British Empire as still undetermined;
however, they maintained that ascendency of the United States over the United Kingdom
on the international scene a fait accompli. In 1943, Harold Macmillan, a rising star in
the Conservative Party who later played a critical and curious role during the Suez Crisis,
articulated this view wonderfully by way of devising a historical allegory. Speaking of
the British upon their status in assessing the ascension of American power and influence,
Macmillan declared, “We are the Greeks in the New Roman Empire.”73 In this
comparison, as historian John Charmley explains, America as the New Romans “had the
military prowess and the treasure with which to rule, but they were, so the stereotype had
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it, rather brainless and therefore in need of guidance from the subtle and better-educated
Greeks.”74 This theory, eloquently condensed by Macmillan, left hope that with the war
winding down the British role in the forming Western alliance and evolving “special
relationship” would not have to be one of total subservience to their American partner.
As events from the ending of World War II until Suez shows in many aspects this model
-- even if its justification is far-fetched -- of an autonomous Britain under the shadow of a
hegemonic America proved to a certain extent to be correct.
There is no denying that from the dawning of the Great Rapprochement until the
many jubilant celebrations over V-J Day, the United States and Great Britain made
competent and willing allies on several occasions. When individual concerns coincided,
both countries put aside their disagreements and agreed to combat a threating “other.”
While idealists on both sides of the Atlantic interpreted this mutual cooperation as signs
of some mythical eternal bond of friendship, it simply boiled down to plain naked selfinterest dressed up in the flashy, but cheap, garbs of a false Anglo-Saxon commonality.
For the British to gamble strategic operations, such as the invasion of Egypt in 1956,
upon the reliance of altruistic U.S. support grounded in the history of Anglo-American
relations stood oddly counterintuitive. During the first forty-five years of the twentieth
century, only when Americans found it directly beneficial to themselves did they ever
rush to aid their struggling “cousins.” Even with the breakdown of the Grand SovietAnglo-American Alliance over Stalin’s expansionist foreign policies, this trait of the U.S.
still refused to be reverse entirely. At the end of World War II, with the community of
nations already choosing sides between the communist East or the capitalist West, the
United States continued to leave their “special” ally to fend for themselves more times
than not. By the 1950s, policymakers of Britain -- in turn -- reciprocated by creating
wrinkles of their own to the Anglo-American relationship.
Although Winston Churchill began employing the term “special relationship”
shortly after the Americans joined the war effort in the early 1940s, it did not gain
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prominence until his usage of it in his “Sinews of Peace” address on March 5, 1946.75 By
this time, with Cold War tensions heating up, the cooling off of Anglo-American
cooperation was well underway. Starting even before the official end of the Second
World War, the British public gave their American counterparts a shock. In the summer
of 1945, they voted out their beloved war-time leader and selected in his place a
socialist.76 Perplexed by Clement Attlee’s electoral victory over the half-American
Churchill, one U.S. politician proclaimed this move by the British public, “a very long
step toward communism.”77 Swift to alleviate such fears in the United States, Attlee
announced his government as strongly anti-communist and declared Britain’s
commitment to the Atlantic alliance intact.78 Nevertheless, substantial disagreements
with America plagued his premiership.
Conflicts of an economic and diplomatic nature soon arose between the Attlee
Government and the Truman Administration. On the day after V-J Day, the American
government abruptly halted the lead-lease program, which had then become a sustaining
lifeline to the British economy. Faced with an “economic Waterloo,” Attlee sent famed
economist John Maynard Keynes to Washington hoping to negotiate funds for his now
nearly bankrupt nation from its much wealthier ally. Keynes, confident that he could
convince his American counterparts to gift much of the needed capital, considered that
such an allotment of funds a fitting reward for the suffering the British endured while
America refused to join into the war effort until late 1941. The U.S. representatives
thought otherwise.79 When the terms and conditions of the 1946 Anglo-American loan
agreement were finalized, no altruistic gifts, or as Keynes had also put it “justice,” for the
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British people laid included in its text.80 As an English reporter smartly summarized for
the British, “It is aggravating to find that our reward for losing a quarter of our national
wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a century to those who have been
enriched by war.”81 Quickly coming on the heels of this humiliating loan arrangement
was news of the passage into law by the American government of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 -- or as commonly titled the McMahon Act. Disregarding vital contributions by
British scientists to the Manhattan Project along with an earlier pledge by the U.S. to
share the discovery of atomic bomb with the United Kingdom, the McMahon Act forbid
imparting of nuclear secrets to any foreign power. 82 In defiance of the U.S. wishes to
halt nuclear proliferation, Britannia forged her own path. Fearful that an anti-colonial
America would not defend its overseas possessions against a threatening atomic power
(namely, the Soviet Union), the British government sought its own nuclear deterrent.
Attlee’s Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, stated after reviewing the potential power of the
atomic bomb, “We've got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs . . . . We've got to
have the bloody Union Jack on top of it.”83 To the chagrin of many in America, British
scientists granted Bevin his wish with the success of Operation Hurricane, the initial
successful testing of a nuclear device by the U.K., on October 3, 1952.84
Although these discernible differences caused relations to deteriorate between the
two nations, Cold War pressures held the fundamental alliance together during these
early years of the special relationship. Marked with the perceived encroachment of the
Soviet Union upon Western spheres of interest in Europe and the Middle East, the United
States maintained a firm internationalist bent to its foreign policy. It did not retreat to the
safety of its own hemisphere, as it had after World War I, but instead spearheaded a
multinational coalition against communist expansion. Yet, this coalition made obvious
the increasingly subservient place the United Kingdom now held in this alliance.
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Stretched to its limit by financial confines and logistical commitments of its continuing
Empire, by 1946 Great Britain found itself unable to adequately support Greece’s
friendly government against communist insurgents or protect Turkey from unwarranted
Soviet influence.85 Forced to withdraw troops and funds from the conflict in Greece,
Bevin quickly fired off a telegram to his American counterpart pleading with him to fill
the void of the extracting British support.86 Recognizing the need to curb further Soviet
expansion, Secretary of State Dean Acheson swiftly agreed America needed to
supplement and continue economic and military aid to Turkey and Greece, which could
no longer be provided by its English ally. Although this commitment by the United
States to replace and expand Western assistance to countries facing communist insurgents
-- commonly known as the Truman Doctrine -- secured the U.S. and the U.K. as partners
against the Soviet Union, and it also revealed the true pecking order of that union in the
eyes of the United States. As Acheson decried, this episode showed to America that as a
world power, “the British are finished. They are through.”87
By the return of Winston Churchill to the premiership in 1951, Britain found itself
fighting a two-front war. Numerous observers in London saw both flanks as uphill
battles. Mired with anti-colonial sentiments in many parts of the Empire, guerrilla
warfare dotted the decreasingly red-colored charts of British colonies while maps
denoting Asia and Europe turned increasingly red of a different shade. To the vexation of
the newly reelected Churchill, large chunks of the British Empire he once governed were
now bygone memories. Under amplified pressure from the Truman Administration,
Attlee had allowed India and Palestine to slip from English rule.88 Adding to Churchill’s
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frustration came the perceived failure of the West to sufficiently heed his warning of the
encroaching threat of international Marxism. Pressed to the limits by its decreased global
influence and ability to project national power, the British Empire needed to make a
choice. Unable to commit to both fighting internal dangers to its colonial holdings while
rigorously combating every external communist threat around the globe, Britain, under
the leadership of Churchill, decided to salvage the enduring remnants of British imperial
power. Concentrating upon fighting pitched holding actions in Kenya, Malaysia, and
Egypt, the United Kingdom left the wider geopolitical conflict of the Cold War squarely
on the shoulders of the United States. This British course of action set an unruly wave of
displeasure between the Atlantic powers.
By the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower as the thirty-fourth American
president, the Cold War had turned increasingly hot. While fighting side by side in a
stalemated Korea, the governments of the United States and Great Britain found
themselves increasingly at odds on maintaining a united Anglo-American foreign policy
in regards to the rest of the world. As historian Daniel Williamson argues, the primary
reason for this disunion was that “Britain did not place its own [foreign] policies,
designed to defend its status as a global power, in subordination to the American plans
for containing Communism.”89 When forced to choose between stalwartly promoting an
anti-communism agenda or protecting its Empire, Britain always chose empire.90
Williamson clearly agrees with this assessment: “The principal goal of Britain’s foreign
policy was to stop the erosion of its power. America’s overwhelming concern was to
stop the expansion of Communism.”91 China stands as the perfect hallmark of these
diverging policies. With the failure of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 to hold mainland China,
communist domination of a third of the globe became a reality.92 American politicians of
both liberal and conservative stripes reeled at this event. This “fall of China” contributed
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significantly to the rise of a second Red Scare in the United States and the advent of
McCarthyism. Yet in America’s closest ally, the mood was far less apocalyptic.
To preserve its colony of Hong Kong from Red Chinese aggression, Great Britain
eagerly sought to establish cordial diplomatic relations with Mao Zedong’s new
government.93 In 1950, to the profound irritation of the American government, Britannia
recognized the People’s Republic of China and withdrew her recognition of the
Nationalist regime on Taiwan.94 Then in 1954-55, during what would be termed the First
Offshore Crisis, the U.K. refused, over intense American pressure, to support Taiwan
against aggressions from the mainland communist government.95 U.S. frustrations at the
refusal of Great Britain to follow its lead during this time also brought clashes over
another Asia nation.96 In 1954, with French colonial forces making a desperate final
stand at Dien Bien Phu, the United States longed to aid its French ally in Indochina.
Although a committed anti-colonial, Eisenhower and his administration sought frantically
to deny a victory in Vietnam to the communist insurgents led by Ho Chi Minh. In the
waning days of the war, the Americans proposed to the British a joint action to save the
beleaguered French forces. Titled Operation Vulture, it entailed the usage of massive
American air power to lift the siege of Dien Bien Phu.97 Although Eisenhower requested
only token British forces to foster an appearance of bilateral action, Churchill and Eden -believing the French fight to hold Vietnam a lost cause -- declined to commit any aircraft
to the effort. Without British support, Eisenhower refused to green light the operation,
leaving the encircled French army to surrender on May 7.98
Only when faced with naked communist aggression, such as in Korea, did Britain
ever enthusiastically join the American anti-communist crusade during the late 1940s to
the mid-1950s. Contrary to Macmillan’s airy metaphor of post-war Anglo-American
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relations, the British-Greeks held their own against the American-Romans when the issue
of their Empire or their national interest demanded. As Dwight Eisenhower angrily
discovered on occasions, Winston Churchill -- and by 1955, Anthony Eden sans his
mentor -- sought to safeguard Britain as a world power, at any expense. If it upset the
Anglo-American alliance in the process, so be it. For as Eden and Churchill viewed it in
the increasingly bi-polar climate of the Cold War, a Britain without its colonial holdings
(i.e. Empire) stood only as a near-client state of the United States; indeed only a
subservient Greek backwater in an idealist-based Roman Empire.
Many of the roots of Suez are here. The history of Anglo-American relations
from the Great Rapprochement to the Special Relationship demonstrates that only when
entwined by self-regarding national interest do countries rush to aid one another. From
its inception, during the Spanish-American War, up through the twentieth century, the on
again, off again alliance between the United States and Great Britain left little room for
sentimentality; it remained strictly business. Pushed by differing objectives during the
Suez Crisis, the U.S. and U.K. worked to their own discernible ends -- as they had
consistently done in the past. In November 1956, Britain sought to prolong its influence,
prestige, and standing in the world. During the same period, America looked for
potential confederates to join in its struggle against Moscow. Dual and opposing
priorities of America’s quest for Cold War allies vs. British attempts to hold on to its
waning empire came to a fever pitch. Anglo-American interests were binary opposed;
hence, the United States put the Atlantic Alliance on hold -- just as Churchill and Eden
did on the matters of Vietnam and China. On the battlegrounds of the Sinai Peninsula,
America gained no advantage from a British victory, so felt no urgent need to seek one.
If historical sentiment played any part in the U.S.’s decisions during Suez, it was not
based on the cooperationist past of the two English-speaking powers, but more likely due
to on an intense contempt against the British Empire rooted in the American psyche.
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CHAPTER III
THE LION AND THE SPHINX
“In Egypt I see they are remembering the bombardment of Alexandria. That kind of
thing could be done in the Nineteenth Century: it cannot be done now, we are working
under an entirely different code.”99
-Prime Minister Clement Attlee, 1951
“If we have any more of their [the Egyptians] cheek we will set the Jews on them and
drive them into the gutter from which they should never have emerged.”100
-Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 1951
In 1956, exacerbated by recent events in the Middle East, Anthony Eden
summoned his Private Secretary, Anthony Nutting, for a meeting. Nutting, on orders
from his superior to formulate a plan to solve the perplexing problem of Gamal Abdel
Nasser, had utterly failed in his mentor’s estimation. Angered at tepid proposals made by
his protégé, the prime minister unleashed his fury. Shouting across the telephone line
Eden exclaimed, “What’s all this poppycock you’ve sent me . . . what’s all this nonsense
about isolating Nasser or ‘neutralizing’ him, as you call it?”101 Bellowing to his aide he
continued, “I want him destroyed, can’t you understand . . . and I don’t give a damn if
there’s anarchy and chaos in Egypt.”102 Recounting in his memoirs, Nutting states that
this encounter with the prime minister left him feeling as if he had just awoken from a
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nightmare, “only the nightmare was real.”103 While many observers might find this
proposed reaction by Anthony Eden justified in response to Nasser’s seizure of the Suez
Canal, they might alter their opinion through the addition of one simple fact. The
conversation occurred in March, over five months before Egypt nationalized the Canal.
For contrary to perceived notions Eden’s animosity with -- and one could almost term his
unwavering hatred of -- Gamal Abdel Nasser stems prior to the events of the Suez Crisis.
A strong case for the raison d'être in the British invasion of Egypt is not only the retaking
of the canal, but also the overthrowing of this apparent nemesis of Eden. Yet even before
the rise of these combative men to the heads of their respective nations, Anglo-Egyptian
relations stood routed for a likely collision. A successful imperialistic Britain and an
independent nationalist Egypt were in many respects not a duel possibility. Only with the
Suez Crisis did these unstable mixtures of individuals and national interests finally find
resolution.
Cursed by their country’s geographical location, later exponentially buoyed by the
creation of the Suez Canal, Egyptians found autonomy and self-determination as
unreachable objectives through much of their history in the modern age. Not without
strong provocation, these descendants of kings and pharaohs can blame only one entity
that bears the most responsibility for this national suppression -- namely the British
Empire. Drawn to the strategic importance of Egypt brought about by its centrally to
three continents, the British, from an early age, sought to keep this region out of the
hands of their foreign enemies. From chasing a French revolutionary army headed by a
young Corsican general away from the Nile, to supporting the Ottoman Turks rule over
Egypt, the protection of this vital area remained an uttermost priority to London
throughout the early 1800s.104 With the opening of the Suez Canal, the ante in the minds
of those controlling Westminster upped substantively. With the Empire now spreading
across many parts of Asia and the Pacific, coupled with the still critical importance of
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India to the motherland, quicker travel to these far-flung possessions stood as an
imperative need. In order to protect these hard fought-over lands from either internal
uprisings or external invasions Britannia required the ability to transport her armies and
navies swiftly. This quicker waterway glimmered as a heaven-sent answer, yet it also
arose new tactical priorities. As historian Lawrence James writes, “The completion of
the Franco-Egyptian-financed Suez Canal in 1869 increased the need for Britain to
remain the dominant power in the Middle East.”105 Not to mention it also initiated an
outright invasion and subsequent war. In 1888, with an HRS flotilla riding anchor off its
coastline, the defenders and inhabitants of Alexandria found themselves the first, but
certainly not the last, Egyptians to discover the enormity of Britannia’s regard for their
native land.
After the cessation of Anglo-Egyptian War, while de jure control in Cairo
formally laid at the feet of the Sultan of Turkey’s representative, de facto power rested at
the door of the British High Commissioner. The official status of the Kingdom of Egypt
remained murky up until the 1930s, and British control stood as the reality for those
intervening years. However, concessions were needed to maintain this foreign grip over
Egyptian internal affairs. The major one of these allowances was the 1936 agreement to
the removal of British troops, minus those protecting the Suez Canal, from Egyptian soil.
This success by independence-seeking Egyptians stood only as a fleeting victory, for with
the advent of World War II the British routinely reminded the citizens of Egypt who truly
controlled their nation. On numerous occasions, they were not subtle. When King Faruq
showed sympathy towards the Axis cause, tanks crashed through his palace gates.
Flanked by aides brandishing pistols the British Ambassador then showed himself into
the king’s quarters and ordered at gunpoint the indignant monarch to appoint a pro-Allied
prime minister to govern Egypt; he wisely complied. Although the British stranglehold
over this Middle Eastern nation began to quickly dissipate with the transition from a
world war to a cold one.
In 1950, Egyptian demands for the promised withdraw of British troops steadily
increased. Spurred on by King Farouk, in a bid to retain his power in a sea of a
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nationalist furor, anti-British demonstrations and terroristic acts directed at
Commonwealth soldiers erupted. The focal point of these deeds of intimidation was
largely directed at the Suez Canal Zone, whereby early 1952 its military base laid under
virtual siege. However, on January 26, the bloodletting spilled out onto the streets of the
Egyptian capital. Commonly known as Black Saturday, as a contemporary from the
British embassy described, “It was a day of arson and rioting . . . resulting in the
immediate deaths of two Englishmen.”106 He goes on to recount, “One, dragged from
the Turf Club in the centre of the city, was murdered, his body dismembered and burnt in
the street; the other, cornered trying to escape by jumping from an upstairs window of the
Club, was later found stabbed to death.”107 The final death toll “after weeks of rioting
was put at seventeen British and other nationals living in Cairo.”108
Through specifically targeting British citizens this civil unrest took to looking like
a full-fledged reenactment of an Eastern Europe pogrom. As then Foreign Minister
Anthony Eden recalls, “A number of British-owned buildings were set on fire, as well as
cinemas, restaurants, cafes, and department stores . . . the violence was in the main antiBritish.109” He goes on to recount, “The material damage in central Cairo was later
estimated to amount to three or four million pounds to British interests alone.”110 With
“the country . . . teetering on the edge of anarchy,” British commanders in the Canal Zone
made hasty preparations to march for Cairo to protect their countrymen’s lives and
restore order.111 Yet an outlying, but interested, party declined to sanction this rescue
effort. 112

Without this entity’s international support, Anthony Eden refused to issue the
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Years before the official start of Suez Crisis, the United States sought to
undermine any continued British neo-colonial control in Egypt. By 1947, American
policy towards Egypt and the entire Middle East was already changing direction from its
British ally. As Lawrence James explains, “the aim of America’s policy was to cajole
rather than coerce independent Middle Eastern states into the West’s camp.”114 Earlier
Cold War considerations had intertwined an Anglo-American need of maintaining the
large network of airfields of the Canal Zone in British hands for the possible bombing of
southern oil-rich regions in the Soviet Union. However, after the boon of Ankara
allowing the building of U.S. airbases in Turkey, the American necessity for continued
Western control of the Canal Zone evaporated. By the beginning of the 1950s, the
attitude of Washington toward Egypt shifted to one similar to that London held in the
early 1800s. While strategic and direct control stood as an essential imperative for the
British, the American government deemed it unnecessary. As long as unfettered access
to the Suez Canal remained open, who owned the waterway -- the Egyptians or the
British -- mattered little to the U.S. The major factor for this laissez-faire attitude of the
Americans rested upon their priorities, specifically ideology over economics. Unlike
Britain, which depended on canal access for Middle Eastern oil, the United States during
the 1950s supplied it petroleum needs from sources primarily in the Western hemisphere.
As Anthony Eden’s private secretary, who later headed Middle Eastern Affairs at the
Foreign Office, Evelyn Shuckburgh explained, “for the United States the Cold War is
paramount, whereas for the United Kingdom our economic strength is at the moment
fundamental.”115 Chief on the agenda for the United States remained to contain the
international spread of communism and the influence of the Soviet Union. Supporting a
British intervention against a non-aligned native population, such as the one proposed in
1952, simply did not fit that bill -- nor would a bloody battle over an open canal for that
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matter.116 Even so the Americans did not have to cross that last bridge for another four
years.
In spite of the fact that the wrath of the Egyptians took the form of anti-British
riots in the early months of 1952, it soon turned back to a long-simmering anger directed
towards their monarch. When the Jews of Palestine declared their independence in 1948,
King Farouk had followed suit with his fellow Arabic leaders and invaded the newly
minted nation of Israel. Although their collected goal stood to push the Zionists back into
the sea from wince they came, it did not go as planned. Popular resentment of this
failure, compounded by a rising Arab nationalism, and rampant corruption in his
government finally brought a reckoning for King Farouk. On July 22, 1952, a cabal of
young Egyptian military commanders, known as the Free Officers Movement, overthrew
their unpopular sovereign and took charge of the country.117 Caught off guard by the turn
of events, all the foreign embassies in Cairo, “were taken by surprise, none more so than
the British embassy.”118 The response to the regime change by London stood restrained.
As an Egyptian journalist recounts, “had the King commanded the smallest degree of
confidence they [the British] might have backed him, but he did not. Nor was there any
real excuse for forcible intervention.”119 Despite some initial trepidation diplomacy
between British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, and the new Egyptian leader,
Muhammad Naguib started well. Eden, who sought a solution for Sudanese
independence from Egypt, found the first president of Egypt, Naguib, quite malleable to a
settled agreement on the situation.120 Nevertheless, by February 1953, Anglo-Egyptian
cooperation hit a major snag. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second-ranking member of the
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Army Council of Revolution after President Naguib, declared in a fiery speech that if
British forces did not “immediately and unconditionally” withdraw from the Suez Canal
Zone, they would need to “fight for their lives.”121 To say the least, the young Interior
Minister of Egypt did not like to mince his words.
Nasser first began speaking out against the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which
allowed British troops to remain stationed in the Suez Canal Zone, in October 1952. In
an interview with Margaret Higgins of the New York Times, he demanded a total removal
of all British forces from Egypt within six months.122 He also pressed for a renegotiating
of the ’36 Treaty or threatened increased guerrilla attacks on British encampments.123
Nasser’s less-than-diplomatic rhetoric on this issue brought him a windfall of support;
forcing the colonial presence of the British Empire out of Sinai Peninsula held an almost
universal appeal to the Egyptian populace. As his Minister of the Interior continued to
issue not-so-veil threats of death to soldiers of the United Kingdom, President Naguib
found the U.K.’s closest ally wooing him for Egyptian support.
Only four months after taking office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles paid
the new leader of Egypt a visit in May of 1953.124 Looking to promote American
goodwill, Dulles arrived in Cairo bearing a unique gift. While the British stationed in the
Suez Canal Zone were suffering up to a dozen casualties a day from Egyptian snipers and
saboteurs, the American diplomat graciously gave the de facto dictator a pistol.125 The
pearl-handled revolver came inscribed: “To General Naguib from his friend Dwight D.
Eisenhower.”126 Intentional or not, the present should have registered, at least in part,
where American sympathies or lack thereof laid. Also on his visit, Dulles found time to
sit down with, who knowledgeable observers viewed as the rising power in Egypt, Gamal
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Nasser. In their meeting, Dulles pressed Nasser into joining a forthcoming regional anticommunist pact directed against the Soviet Union.127 Refusing to commit to such an
alliance, Nasser, in turn, requested from the American government two things, weapons
and diplomatic support in forcing the 80,000 British soldiers off Egyptian soil. On the
issue of arms sales, Dulles remained evasive, but the Egyptian Interior Minister did have
an effect on him concerning the other two matters discussed. As a close confidant of
Nasser later recounted, “Dulles was influenced by the strength of Nasser’s arguments
against Egypt’s joining a mutual security pact and afterwards Dulles drew back from
wholehearted support of the Baghdad Pact.”128 In addition, the American diplomat
“became convinced of the need to ease the path of Britain’s withdrawal from Egypt.”129
While historians continue to argue over the amount of influence Dulles held over
American foreign policy vis-à-vis Eisenhower, on this last matter the argument can be
considered moot. As the president wrote in his memoirs, concerning that particular issue
Eisenhower and, after his meeting with Nasser, Dulles stood in complete agreement.
Writing on the subject Eisenhower states, “I believed that it would be undesirable and
impracticable for the British to retain sizable forces permanently in the territory of a
jealous and resentful government amid an open hostile population.”130 While
Eisenhower’s assessment on the feasibility of the British retention of their strategic
foothold is debatable, the president fails to recount that his same estimation could apply
to American involvement around the world in his nation’s past and then near future.
Pressed by the Dulles and Eisenhower, Winston Churchill reluctantly reentered
talks with Egypt over its continued troop presence in the Canal Zone in 1954. As with
previous discussions between the parties, sticking points still held up a suitable
agreement. While Naguib and Nasser considered the Suez Canal Zone as the rightful
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property of their nation, Churchill and Eden sought to uphold the terms of 1936 AngloEgyptian Treaty that granted sovereignty of this territory to Great Britain until 1956.
This year “1956” stood as looming deadline for the United Kingdom. When signing the
treaty in 1936, Anthony Eden agreed to only a twenty-year charter for British control of
the zone, but with a caveat stating at the end of that time period a renegotiation of the
treaty would commence. By 1954, with the current state of affairs between Great Britain
and Egypt standing as they were, the chances of a new treaty favorable to the interests of
the U.K. looked quite dismal. However as the parley between the two governments
continued fortune shined on the British Empire, for the Egyptian negotiators sought an
agreement as soon as possible.
Since the overthrow of the King, two years before, the stability of the Egyptian
government remained -- in one word -- shaky. After taking power, as even a close
confidant of Gamal Abdel Nasser admits, the members of the Revolutionary Command
Council held no calculated agenda for bettering their nation; he writes, “apart from
getting rid of the King and his corrupt associates, the Free Officers had few plans.”131
Unhappy with the perceived lack of progress by their new national leaders, factory
workers rioted less than a month after the military coup, “when the police and army
attempted to restore order nine people were killed and more than twenty were
wounded.”132 Rudderless from the beginning, the Egyptian ship of state found itself beset
by an increasingly amount of internal criticism -- with a substantial amount coming from
a growing religious faction calling itself the Muslim Brotherhood.133 In a wise bid to
foster national cohesion, Nasser sought to coalesce the discontented Egyptian population
around a common and popular cause. Driving a time-honored colonial power’s military
from this nation’s soil was the route he sought. It proved a popular one. With Egypt in
the midst of an undeclared guerrilla war with the British army, Nasser’s countrymen
naturally rallied to the cause. Yet the Interior Minister’s compatriots demanded results,
or at the very least substantial process towards driving the foreigners out. Since the illequipped Egyptian military stood little chance in a direct confrontation with the 80,000
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Commonwealth soldiers fortified in the Canal Zone, negotiations with the hated British
Empire proved the quickest solution to the status of forces dilemma and, also, in righting
the helm of the Egyptian state. Efforts to rush an agreement with London
notwithstanding, Muhammad Naguib, the first president of Egypt, still fell from power.
Confined to house arrest and stripped of all his official positions, Naguib would spend the
next eighteen years as a prisoner of the country he once governed. His usurper turned out
not to be from the ranks of religious zealots, secular communists, or counterrevolutionary
monarchists as he might have feared, but that of his ablest lieutenant. By September
1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser, after overthrowing his revolutionary confederate, had
become the unquestioned ruler of Egypt at the age of 36.134
On October 19, the final signatures of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement took place.
Considered by some as the true date of Egyptian independence, both sides gave up much
from their perspectives to achieve it. While, as mentioned above, both parties had selfish
interests in concluding an arrangement, they also found themselves beset with an outside
pressure to come to a quick rapport. Prior to signing the treaty, each side found the
United States pushing them into an arraignment. As former official historian to the
British Cabinet Office William Walker explains both, “The British government under
American pressure to take risks in order to win Egyptian friendship; and the Egyptians
were being encouraged to be reasonable by American promises of generous economic
and military aid.”135 The final terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement included as
Walker states: “British troops would leave Egypt 20 months after the new agreement was
signed; the base would be taken over and run by British civilian contractors for an initial
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period of seven years.”136 However a “trigger for military reactivation of the base would
be an attack on any Arab state and Turkey by an ‘outside power’ other than Israel.”137
Finally the “agreement was gilded by Egypt extending overflying rights and landing
facilities to the RAF, and by an Egyptian reaffirmation of the 1888 Constantinople
Convention, guaranteeing freedom of transit throughout the Suez Canal to all nations in
peace time.”138
Initially the Egyptians and British governments were similarly pleased with their
collective settlement. Nasser got the withdrawal of British troops and international
respect for bringing the conflict to a peaceful resolution. Eden, still foreign secretary,
received an extended lease on the Canal Zone and its military installations, plus a signed
commitment for its quick reinforcement by British forces in times of war. However, the
euphoria in London and Cairo did not last long.
A week after the official signing of the agreement, during a speech celebrating the
impending withdrawal of the British troops, a would-be assassin fired eight shots at
Nasser.139 Angry at the treaty, the shooter, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, sought
to punish the new Egyptian leader for his perceived collaboration with the colonial
British. Shortly afterward Nasser instituted a violent crackdown on the Brotherhood and
other potential insurgents. Now very mindful of the fates of the two men who previously
ruled Egypt before him, Nasser also sought ways to bolster his support among his fellow
countrymen. While he introduced domestic improvements, such as land reform and
infrastructure developments, Nasser also sought popular acclaim through the avenue of
foreign affairs. Wishing to champion himself as a proponent for Arab nationalism and a
foe of Western imperialism, the young president of Egypt found hindering British
interests as the means to this goal. Never coy, Nasser more-or-less stated this fact in a
fateful gathering with none other than his future chief adversary during the Suez Crisis -Anthony Eden.
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Four days before the one and only meeting between Anthony Eden and Gamal
Nasser, Turkey and Iraq signed a mutual defense treaty colorfully termed the Northern
Tier.140 The agreement stood as the first step towards the creation of METO (Middle
East Treaty Organization) or more commonly called the Bagdad Pact.141 Formed on the
same basis as the European-orientated NATO and the Asia-Pacific SEATO, the Bagdad
Pact’s genesis laid in Western attempts to contain communist expansion in a specific
global region.
Unsurprisingly this intimal step towards METO dominated the two men’s
conversation as they sat down in the British Embassy in Cairo on February 24, 1955.
Looking to regain Egypt’s strategic position firmly back into the column of the West,
Eden pressed Nasser to join the emerging pact. Nasser, just as he did with Dulles in their
meeting two years before, attempted to lay out the reasons why joining such a pact did
not benefit Egyptian interests. Unlike Dulles, Eden remained unmoved by Nasser
arguments and took the rejection somewhat as a personal affront. With the rise of Arab
nationalism and the rulers of Middle Eastern nations seeking more autonomy from British
involvement in their countries’ affairs, Eden viewed METO as the key to keeping the
critical region under the influence of the United Kingdom. Without Nasser’s
participation in the Bagdad Pact, it severely limited the agreement’s usefulness and
undermined its legibility in the eyes of the world. In addition, without Egypt joining into
the treaty, America, fearful of alienating Nasser and the millions of Arabs who he
influenced, refused to enter the organization as well. Still leaving the meeting, Eden,
now mindful of Nasser, still did not view the Egyptian leader as an outright enemy, just
difficult.142 However, after taking office as prime minister of Great Britain, Eden’s
attitude radically changed.
Despite Nasser’s outright refusal to join the METO, Anthony Eden, now prime
minister after succeeding the retiring Churchill on April 6, sought to pressure Egypt into
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joining the organization by others means -- namely carrots and sticks. First, alongside
their American ally, Great Britain offered funding for a major infrastructure program
close to Nasser’s heart. Since seizing power, Nasser longed to build a dam on the Nile at
Aswan. Seemingly unmoved by this gesture of goodwill, Nasser continued his antiBritish campaign. Broadcasting from powerful radio stations to large sections of the
Middle East, the Egyptian leader spoke out against the Bagdad Pact and perceived British
colonialism it represented.143 The need for action only intensified when in September,
with the full blessing of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia sold 250 million dollars of
military equipment to Egypt.144 Fearful that this very harmonious gesture by a Warsaw
Pact nation was the first step of communist encroachment into the Middle East, Anthony
Eden now maneuvered to isolate Nasser’s influence in the region.145 He sought to
achieve this detachment by bringing the nation of Jordan into METO. As it became more
and more apparent to both the Arab populace and their unelected leaders, Eden and
Nasser were now engaged in a struggle for which one of them would lead the Arab
world. If Jordan joined the Bagdad Pact, it signified to all that it sided with Britain, but if
the nation declined Nasser substantially benefited. According to then British Foreign
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, King Abdullah I bin al-Hussein initially agreed to bring Jordan
into the pact.146 However, by January 1956, with public pressure vigorously stirred by
Egyptian propaganda, the government of Jordan ceded in the face of violent
demonstrations to withhold joining METO.147 For Nasser, the non-event marked a major
victory, to Eden a bitter defeat. As events in Jordan continued to transpire, what came
next marked Gamal Abdel Nasser as a dead man in the eyes of Anthony Eden.
The murky transition from colonial province to an independent state occasionally
created unlikely couplings. By 1956, in the case of the transfiguration from Transjordan
to the Kingdom of Jordan, one such eccentric paring remained. Since its independence
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from Great Britain in 1946, the nation of Jordan had had a British officer as the
commander of its army. Lieutenant-General John Glubb stood as a walking anachronism;
born and raised in England, he had commanded the Arab Legion (the Jordanian army)
since 1939. While his leadership of a foreign army probably seemed odd to many around
the world, in Great Britain it stood as a guarded sense of pride and respect. All that
evaporated when on March 1, 1956, bowing to the internal anti-British sentiment of his
subjects and wanting to assert his authority, King Hussein unceremoniously discharged
Glubb of his position.148 As Harold Macmillan recounts the dismissal of Glubb, caused
an uproar in London for, “the blow to British prestige was serious.”149 As explanations
were sought in the House of Commons for this drastic failure, Anthony Eden saw only
one man as the instigator of this very British humiliation -- Gamal Nasser. Unperturbed
by the lack of facts, the British Prime Minster devoutly believed that only Nasser’s
nefarious influence had brought the King to dismiss Glubb.150 Believing drastic
measures were now justified to halt the Egyptian leader, Eden sought Nasser’s removal
from power, by any means necessary.
Recounting in his diary on March 12, Evelyn Shuckburgh describes how Eden
exclaimed to him in regards to Nasser that, “it is either him or us, don’t forget that.”151 As
British historian Calder Walton elaborates, “Eden became obsessed with overthrowing
Nasser, and tasked SIS to instigate a coup to depose or even assassinate.”152 Adding to
the macabre aspect of this unveiling scene came revelations by former assistant Director
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of MI-5 Peter Wright in his controversial bestselling memoir Spycatcher (1987). By mid1956, Wright asserts, “MI6 [had] developed a plan, through the London Station, to
assassinate Nasser using nerve gas.”153 Candidly speaking of his involvement in the
attempt, Wright states, “Their plan was to place canisters of nerve gas inside the
ventilation system, but I pointed out that this would require large quantities of gas, and
would result in massive loss of life among Nasser’s staff.”154 While these notions from a
second-rate spy novel amounted to naught, Eden’s blinding hatred for Nasser remained
absolute. As Anthony Nutting recounts after the dismissal of Glubb in March, “the next
three months passed somewhat uneventfully and without offering any opportunity for
Eden to translate his declaration of war on Nasser into action.”155 “In June the last
British troops left Egyptian soil,” Eden’s private secretary continues, “and with their
departure calm seemed to settle on the scene.”156 This respite stood only as the waning
serenity before the arrival of a looming hurricane. As Nutting explains, “I knew all too
well, it was a deceptive calm. Sooner or later an incident was bound to occur in that most
explosive area which would give Eden the pretext he sought to move in on Egypt and try
to smash Nasser.”157 In July, thanks to a chain of events originating in America, Eden
received his wish; however, he would come to regret it ruefully.
By the summer of 1956, events formed an environment where a confrontation
between Egypt and Great Britain stood as highly probable. While considerable blame for
this situation must lie at the feet of the national leaders in these two countries, another
source is exceedingly culpable as well. The United States must not go unmentioned in its
share of responsibility. Playing a shell game with where their allegiance laid, the
Eisenhower administration constantly sent mixed signals to both the British and the
Egyptians. No shining example stands as clear as the U.S.’s position on the Bagdad Pact.
After the signing of Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954, relations between Britain and
Egypt improved, yet rancor over METO brought them again to an adversarial position.
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Initial American enthusiasm, especially from John Foster Dulles, sold Britain on the need
of the Pact’s formation. However when it came time to put pen to paper, the U.S. refused
to join. Writing on the topic, Harold Macmillan states American Secretary of State
Dulles, “had used every possible pressure upon us to become full members and to give it
our active support; but he continued, throughout 1955, to refuse . . . to commit the United
States to membership. That decision placed the whole burden upon Britain.”158 Even
after America itself baulked at joining the organization in response to Nasser’s attacks on
the Pact, the United States continued to manipulate its would-be direction from behind
the scenes. It was none other than the U.S. who urged Britain to press Jordan into joining
METO. Macmillan states that the Eisenhower administration anxiously urged the British
to, “persuade Jordan to join in order to relieve the isolation of Iraq, at present the only
Arab member inside the Pact.”159 This American request brought Anglo-Egyptian
relations to an even lower ebb for reasons stated previously.
On the Egyptian side of the British-Egyptian divide, an unreliable America caused
problems as well. Attempting to coax gratitude from the Nasser regime, a double-dealing
Dulles offered to use American influence to prevent further Arab membership in the
Bagdad Pact. While discussing such a proposal, Dulles argued, “I believe that Nasser
would be willing to pay a considerable price to get the United States in limiting the
Baghdad Pact to its present Arab membership.160 Adding to this Janus-faced stance on
METO, is the U.S. continued refusal to sell arms to Egypt; even after intimating such an
arrangement stood as a distinct possibility. As Dwight Eisenhower writes, “As early as
February of that year [1955] Nasser had attempted to obtain arms from the United
States.”161 Instead of outright rejecting the offer, as the British desired, the Americans
left the door to such a proposal not quite shut. “Our State Department,” Eisenhower
continues, “confident that [Nasser] was short of money, informed him that payment
would be expected in cash rather than barter.”162 A major motivation for the 1955
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Egyptian-Czech arms deal that concerned Eden was an attempt by Nasser to cajole
America to sell arms to Egypt by playing off its cold war fears.163 Although the Egyptian
leader’s ruse failed, it contributed greatly to distrust between Britain and Egypt. Heading
into the maelstrom of the Suez Crisis, it is without a doubt America contributed greatly to
the atmosphere that provoked it.
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CHAPTER IV
INTO THE VORTEX
(July 19 –October 28)
“Britain considered Suez as something as a symbol, a symbol of their position in the
entire Middle East and the Arab world; their reaction [to its seizure] was not immediately
predictable but it would require all we could do to keep the lid from blowing off.”
Dwight Eisenhower, reflecting on Suez164
“The Americans would not have moved until all was lost. All through the Canal
negotiations Dulles was twisting and wriggling and lying to do nothing.”
-Anthony Eden, reflecting on Suez165
Not surprisingly, given its then recent history of involvement between the two
nations, an act by America sparked Anthony Eden’s long-awaited confrontation between
Egypt and the United Kingdom. Around noon on June 19, 1956, in meeting with the
Egyptian Ambassador, John Foster Dulles calmly lit the spark that exploded into the Suez
Crisis.166 Originating about a year before, the reason for this hastily planned consultation
boiled down to money -- Nasser desperately needed it, and Dulles steadfastly refused it.
Since taking office, Nasser “had been working to turn his dream of building a high dam
at Aswan into a reality.”167 This massive building project was estimated to cost $1 billion
dollars, “which $400 million would have to be in foreign currency.”168 While the World
Bank promised, half of this external sum (200 million) to Egypt, Nasser still required the
rest from another source. In an effort to foster closer relations and to forestall a proposal
of aid by the Soviet Union, the Eisenhower Administration tentatively offered to provide
loans to help make-up the difference.169 The terms of such an agreement tied a
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substantial American loan with the offer of aid by the World Bank. It also included a
pledge, made before the Anglo-Egyptian incidents over Jordan, of around 14 million in
sterling by the United Kingdom.170 Although eager to build the dam, Nasser, fearful of
Egypt falling into the orbit of the United States, refused implicit conditions tacked on a
potential Egyptian-American loan agreement.171 These stipulations primary included
attempts by America to influence the foreign policy of Egypt -- such as getting Nasser to
support a U.S. sponsored Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and halting arms purchases from
the communist bloc.172 As negotiations over the Aswan aid package stalled, U.S.
enthusiasm waned, for as Anthony Eden notes, “The Egyptian financial position
deteriorated and it became more and more doubtful whether the Egyptian government
would be able to cover their part of the inevitable expenditure for the dam project.”173
Astoundingly, Eden, now actively plotting Nasser’s demise, actually thought it best not to
rescind formally the Western offer to aid the Aswan project, but to simply let it “wither
on the vine.”174 However, by mid-summer 1956, his American allies thought a message
need to be sent to Nasser. One clarifying that in the view of Eisenhower and Dulles,
Egypt rapidly had to choose if it stood with America or the Soviets; in their estimation,
no middle ground would suffice.
In May, Egypt formally extended diplomatic recognition to mainland China.175 In
a bid to circumvent an impending United Nations arms embargo on sells to Middle
Eastern nations, Nasser planned to buy weapons from the Red Chinese, who were not
members of the U.N. so not bound to any such embargo.176 The news of this latest
Egyptian embracement with a communist power stood as the final straw in Washington
D.C.; Nasser required a stern lesson. Up to the task, Dulles gave it to him in spades. One
minute after Ahmed Hussin, Egypt’s Ambassador to the U.S., walked through Dulles’
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door at the State Department for his June 19 meeting, a spokesperson for the Department,
“issued a statement to waiting reporters announcing the withdrawal of America’s offer of
aid.”177 Before the two men had even uttered a word, the U.S. announced its intentions
on the matter to the world. Stunned at this undiplomatic display of bluster, Nasser found
himself at a vulnerable place on the international stage.178 Even excluding the public
humiliation by the American, Dulles’ act stung the Egyptian president hard. For with the
withdrawal of potential U.S. aid, the World Bank revoked its agreement of assistance on
the Aswan project as well, since the two offers were interlinked. Backed onto a ledge
custom-made by the United States, Nasser needed to find a way to 1) regain his stature in
eyes of the world, and 2) find alternative funding for the Aswan Dam to retain his
popularity in Egypt. Refusing to jump into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union or fall
into the lap of a reconciliatory America, Nasser, to the extreme detriment of the British
Empire, decided to leap.
On July 26, when word first arrived in London and Washington that Nasser had
seized the Suez Canal, Anthony Eden and Dwight Eisenhower took the bulletin quite
differently. In America, its president urged caution; in Great Britain, its prime minister
demanded war. Dining with the King of Iraq and the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said
when the news broke, Eden received some hurried advice from one of his guests. Nuri
counseling Eden, told him, “You only have one course of action open and that is to hit,
hit now, and hit hard. Otherwise it will be too late. If [Nasser] is left alone, he will finish
all of us.”179 Although this shrewd advice did not fall on deaf ears, it stood
superfluously. For the British prime minister already understood the stakes and knew
which course to proceed down. Writing in his memoirs, Eden recounts his thoughts of
that July evening, “I had no doubt how Nasser’s deed would be read . . . [t]his was a
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seizure of Western property in reply to the action of the United States Government.
Upon its outcome would depend whose authority would prevail.”180 Eden quickly
adjourned to the Cabinet Room with his foreign minister, Selwyn Lloyd; the Lord
Chancellor, David Maxwell Fyfe; the Lord President of the Council, Robert GascoyneCecil (5th Marquess of Salisbury), and Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
Alec Douglas-Home.181 Rapidly summoned to join the impromptu meeting were the
chiefs of staff of the armed forces; the French Ambassador, Jean Chauvel; and in lieu of
the U.S. Ambassador, the American Charge d’Affaires, Andrew Foster.182 The inclusion
of the nation’s top echelon military leaders plus representatives of the country’s two
closest strategic allies set the tone of the meeting. Eden desired quick and unflinching
action; however, it would not work out as he hoped.
The prime minister hurriedly laid out the first order of business. In front of his
assembled advisors and the two foreign emissaries he directly asked, “When can we take
military action to topple Nasser [and] free the canal?” It was a simple question, backed by
a logical viewpoint. For a mighty empire that retained over 750,000 active duty soldiers
and spent around ten per cent of its gross national product on its military, it seems hard to
believe that Great Britain did not have the capacity to recapture the Canal quite rapidly
after Nasser nationalized it.183 Yet after conversing with his chiefs of staff, that is exactly
what Eden ruefully discovered. Lord Louis Mountbatten, First Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Staff, was first to douse Eden’s hopes of a speedily retaking of the Canal by
recommending that due to numerous restraints, “unilateral action by the Royal Navy and
the Royal Marines should not be taken.”184 As Mountbatten and the other military
commanders explained, if a successful military operation against Nasser were to be
conducted it would take time.185 As accounts of this initial meeting of July 26 and
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numerous subsequent consultations of the chiefs of staff show, the British military faced
numerous problems that severely limited its initial response capabilities to the crisis.186
These hindering complications were two-fold. The first revolved around logistics
and infrastructure. With the forfeit of the Canal Zone in June, the U.K. did not have a
military base near enough to Egypt equipped for handling the massive ships and
numerous landing crafts needed to conduct an invasion. In addition, while Britain did
have over three-quarters of a million men in arms, these forces were widely spread
throughout the globe protecting the rest of the Empire. It would take a lot of precious
time to redirect them against this new objective. The second series of limitations for the
British boiled down to the absence of planning.187 In 1956, all of Great Britain’s defense
arrangements boiled down to dealing with only two likely threats. Either an all-out
nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union or fighting insurgency in its colonies, “almost no
provision existed for limited or conventional war of the old sort.”188 However facing
these stark realities gave Eden little pause in altering his favored course of action. For
him only the timetable needed changing -- the dogs of war were still to be unleashed.
After a meeting with the full Cabinet, Eden found it members supporting this assessment.
Reviewing Nasser’s action they agreed, “That our essential interest in the area must, if
necessary, be safeguarded by military action and that the necessary preparations to this
end must be made.”189 As Harold Macmillan recalled, “the unanimous view of my
colleagues was in favor of strong and resolute action.”190 Provisions started immediately
to gear Britain for the forthcoming conflict. Given the title of “Operation Musketeer” by
the chiefs of staff, this plan for an invasion of Egypt quickly began taking form. In the
first days of the crisis, as the drums for righteous battle steadily increased their pounding
across Albion, on the other side of the Atlantic they remained quite muted.
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After the initial news of the seizure of the Suez Canal broke in Washington, the
primarily concern of President Eisenhower was not to punish Nasser, but to restrain
Eden. From the American perspective, the need of this containment of British action
became readily apparent shortly after Eisenhower received a message from Eden on July
27. In the telegraph, Eden argued that Britain and the U.S. “cannot afford to allow
Nasser to seize control of the Canal in this way.”191 Intimating the direction of action
needed, Eden argued that, “we should not allow ourselves to become involved in legal
quibbles about the rights of the Egyptian government to nationalize what is technically an
Egyptian company.”192 Then to put a finer point on it the Englishman stated, “As we see
it we are unlikely to obtain our objectives by economic pressure alone.”193 It took little
reading of the subtext of the two-page message for Eisenhower to see how Eden wanted
to handle the affair. Negotiations were not the answer; force of arms was the only
solution. With his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles away in South America,
Eisenhower took direct control in the efforts to tempter British fury over the new crisis.
Less than 24 hours after receiving Eden’s communication, the president circumspectly
replied, “While we agree with much that you have to say, we rather think there are one or
two additional thoughts that you might consider.”194 It was not the forceful answer Eden
hoped to receive, yet it did allow for interpretation. Next, due to the unavailability of
Dulles, Eisenhower sent Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy to London. The
president’s instructions to Murphy are telling of his opinion of the matter; he ordered
Murphy to “just go over and hold the fort,” and avoid committing America, “in any
precipitate action with the French and British.”195 It appeared in Eisenhower’s estimation
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the potential reaction of America’s allies stood as a far greater concern than the original
seizure of the Canal.
The causes behind the initial deviation of Anglo-American reactions to Nasser’s
confiscation of the Suez Canal are stark and telling. Embedded here are many reasons
why America left Britannia to fend for herself as the crisis deepens. While the personal
hatred that Eden held toward Nasser, which was conspicuously absence in Eisenhower,
obviously played an important influence, other significant factors contributed to how the
two men conversely viewed the crisis. A truly jumbled mosaic of reasons, justifications,
and national and personal interests motivated the distinct acts of the Atlantic powers
when confronting the predicament.
One cannot overlook the potential economic implications of Nasser’s action for
the British compared to the Americans. In 1956, 80 percent of oil supplying Western
Europe came through the Suez Canal.196 At the beginning of August, Britain had only a
strategic stockpile of six weeks’ worth of oil to reply upon if the Canal closed, after that
the lights were out and the cars grounded to a halt.197 Although Nasser guaranteed to keep
the Canal fully operational as long as Egypt retained control of it, to the British any
promise of the Egyptian leader was highly dubious at best. As Eden surmised with
Nasser controlling the Canal it effectively meant, “He held a knife to our jugular;” or as
Harold Macmillan articulated, “having his thump on our windpipe.”198 Even with setting
aside the hyperbolic rhetoric of the two men, they still raised a valid point. With the vast
wealth of oil in the Northern Sea still undiscovered, Britain remained especially
dependent on Middle Eastern sources. Just the possible closure of the Suez Canal left the
British economy standing on very shaky ground. As Yale professor Diane Kunz recounts
as early as the “afternoon of July 27 . . . sterling was under such strong pressure that the
Bank of England could not determine the rate for transferable sterling.”199 Impossible to
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put it more bluntly, the Executive Director of the Bank of England stated on August 1,
“[T]he situation created by the Egyptian Government imperils the survival of the U.K.
and the Commonwealth, and represents a very great danger to sterling.”200 Through the
eyes of the British, Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal looked like an economic quietus
by a hostile power. Thus in order to safeguard her monetary and financial well-being,
Britannia needed to reverse this egregious event as soon as possible.
An ocean away, things looked quite different. Economically speaking the seizure
of the Canal seemed to raise little concern in the halls of the United States government.
In a Cabinet meeting on July 27, concerns over the subject of the Suez and its effect on
the free transit of oil were viewed as a problem for Europe, not the homeland.201
According to the record of the meeting, Eisenhower seemed more concerned on how the
nationalization of Suez Canal might influence the control of a more vital waterway for
America – the Panama Canal, than its direct result on the United States.202 By early as
August 3, while the British government continued to view itself still under an economic
sword of Damocles, for the U.S. Secretary of Treasury George Humphrey the situation,
still only in its first week, was already abating. In that day’s Cabinet meeting, Humphrey
stated, “that the quieting down of the crisis was very helpful to the Treasury.”203 He
added that lower interest rates for American borrowing seemed certain in “the near
future.”204 On this supposition, Humphrey confuses coloration with causation -- as the
sterling stood under attack, it made logical sense for the American dollar to rally. With
investors and speculators alike attempting to flee the troubled British currency, the
rational safe haven was the American greenback. Hence, the continued control of Suez
Canal by a hostile power to Britain (i.e. Egypt) actually strengthened the United States
economic position in the world. Even more to the point, if the British did invade Egypt
200
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the likelihood of Nasser blocking or damaging the Canal out of vengeance stood as very
likely. If this scenario came to pass and the Canal remained inoperable for an extended
period of time, then the vast majority of Western Europe’s petroleum needs would have
to be supplied mainly from the Western Hemisphere.205 While the United States planned
for this happenstance, its leaders viewed it as very unappealing.206 For it meant unpopular
oil rationing for Americans and probable limiting of economic growth for the nation.207
For all these reasons, from the financial standpoint of America the nationalization of the
Suez Canal was acceptable, but a British attempt in retaking it was not.
Popular opinion and political support also played a significant role in how the
American and British governments proceeded to deal with the crisis. As early as the last
days of July, London-based newspapers started calling for a rapid response to the crisis.
The Daily Mail advised, “We must cry ‘Halt!’ to Nasser as we should have cried ‘Halt’ to
Hitler. Before he sets the Middle East aflame, as Hitler did Europe.”208 Harkening with
similar sentiments was The Times, the News Chronicle, and the Daily Herald.209
Comparisons of Nasser to Hitler were ubiquitous throughout the daily papers and on the
nightly airwaves. Even Hugh Gaitskill, the leader of the Labor Party, got in on the act.
In addressing the House of Commons on August 2, Eden’s primary political opponent
claimed Nasser’s aims were, “all very familiar. It is exactly the same as that we
encountered from Mussolini and Hitler in those years before the war.”210 As the nation
rallied to Anthony Eden’s anti-Nasser crusade, support from other areas of the
Commonwealth also bolstered his determination. In a rejoinder to a cable from Eden, the
Prime Minister of New Zealand made his nation’s sentiments publicly clear. He stated,
“I was able to tell Sir Anthony Eden . . . that Britain could count on New Zealand
standing by her through thick or thin . . . .Where Britain stands, we stand; where she
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goes, we go; in good times and in the bad.”211 Certainly, a stark response compared to
the vacillating reaction offered by the U.S. president. Even without substantial American
support, popular backing for direct action in regaining the Canal remained high
throughout Great Britain.212 As historian David Dutton describes, “In the first days after
nationalization the elements of a Suez consensus appeared to fall into place.”213 While
this initial wave for war dampened in the preceding weeks, in America it never reached
even close to such a fever pitch. In fact, throughout the United States it stood as
nonexistent.
A July 30 article by Harold Callender in the New York Times sums up the tone for
a vast number of Americans to the crisis. For Callender the entire construct of, “the Suez
Canal is a relic and a symbol of an age of European imperialism this is passing.”214 In
1956 America, much of anti-colonialism sentiment fostered since 1776 had not faded.
While pro-Nasser romanticism did not factor into the equation during the early days of
July and August, an abiding sympathy for the Egyptian people stood out. As a New York
Times editorial appearing in August argues, the real issue is not the control of the Canal
but, “the question of what can be done to improve the lives of people as groups and of
individuals as persons . . . . How do the Egyptian people themselves and their neighbors
stand to come out of this dispute?”215 Bleeding heart sentiments like this aside, as
Professor Diane Kunz states, the American press did express some concern, “about the
nationalization of the canal but viewed the matter as a primarily European issue.”216 She
goes on to add, “Editorials stressed conciliation, not condemnation [of Nasser’s action],
and avoided all speculation involving military pressure. This stance reflected the view of
the American public, which was prepared neither to accept oil rationing nor the use of
force for a faraway canal about which they knew little and which had no apparent impact
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on their lives.”217 Even though the U.S. government’s refusal to support military action
against Egypt ultimately wrought disaster onto its closest ally, it, at least, had the
wholehearted support of the American people.
After acquiring their respective offices of president and prime minister,
Eisenhower and Eden desired quite different reputations. With no need of
psychoanalysis, there is little doubt this fact contributed to their actions and mindsets
during the Suez Crisis. Known quite rightfully as a man of war, after his election to the
presidency, Eisenhower sought long and hard to transform his persona in the eyes of the
world to a man of peace. Setting aside his then secret attempts to bring America into the
First Indochina War, by 1956 he had achieved this coveted mantle. Through
negotiations, he had brought the Korean War to an acceptable stalemate in 1953 and
during the Geneva Summit in 1955 broke bread with Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin.
Gearing up for a re-election battle in November, Eisenhower promised to play the role of
peacemaker for the American public. As the Suez Crisis broke, with Britain and France
immediately clambering for war, Eisenhower’s peaceable reputation laid on the line. If
he bowed to Eden’s not-so-subtle demands for support for a British invasion of Egypt,
then it would lay in ruins. If the president needed any restating of this fact, his press
secretary gave Eisenhower a friendly reminder on August 6. In a call to Eisenhower, Jim
Hagerty argued that the American “people are intensely concerned about Suez . . . and
that the British (and French) are edging closer to war.”218 He then prompted the
president about Eisenhower’s recent statement that, “you would go anywhere, anytime, in
the interests of peace.”219 For the man, one of his long-time aides remembered as “slow
to pick up the sword,” the message was superfluous; to Eisenhower, and for the sake of
his reputation, war was not even an option.220
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Since taking office in 1955, Anthony Eden sought to prove to himself and the
British people that he was an apt successor to the great war-time leader Winston
Churchill. As American historian Paul Johnson states Eden’s, “first year in power out of
Churchill’s shadow had been a let-down. He was criticized, especially in his own party,
for lacking ‘the smack of firm government.’’’221 As British journalist James Margach
recounts, “Scarcely had he succeeded Churchill and with astonishing flair won the 1955
general election than decay set in. Of all prime ministers’ honeymoons his was the
briefest.”222 Seen as a weak sister by right-wing members of his own party, by January
1956, “an ‘Eden Must Go’ campaign was sweeping through the Tory Party.”223
Ironically much of this anger from the Right came from a perception that Eden, during
the negotiations of the 1955 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, conceded too much to Nasser.224
With much of Eden’s career and reputation built on his opposition to Neville
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy to Hitler, these attacks stung very close to home. As
attempts to paint Eden as an appeaser to the “Egyptian Hitler” continued, his popularity
in the Conservative party waned. After Nasser had nationalized the Canal, the British
prime minister saw the impending crisis as the perfect test to show the right wing of his
party that he had the mettle to meet the challenge. Diplomacy and talks were not going to
work, force and military strength stood as the favorable option.
After Eisenhower’s envoy to the British, Robert Murphy, touched down at
Heathrow Airport on July 28, things started moving quickly. Attempting to get a lay of
the land, Murphy conversed with numerous British officials over the next two days.225
On orders from Dulles, Murphy instructions were to remind the British that under
American law, “the President had no authorization to commit military action” and
“would require Congressional authorization.”226 In two separate meetings on July 29,
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Murphy, the eyes and ears of the American government, received wildly varying
accounts on the intentions of the British government towards the crisis. In an early
meeting, the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd falsely told him that military force
stood, “as a last resort.”227 Later in a dinner with his old friend and Chancellor of the
Exchequer Harold Macmillan, Murphy found himself lied to yet again when Macmillan
gave, “him the impression that our military expedition to Egypt was about to sail.”228
Searching for explanations for these outright falsehoods told to an American diplomat by
high British government officials is not complicated. On the issue of Lloyd’s claim, it
came from an unequivocal agreement by France to join the British in instrumenting
Operation Musketeer. After discussions with the French Ambassador, Lloyd discovered,
“The French were ready to go all the way with us. They would be prepared to put French
forces under British command if this was necessary.”229 With this diplomatic
breakthrough with France, direct American military support was not required for the
success of Musketeer; hence, Lloyd did not seek it. Lying to Murphy that military action
stood as a last resort made sense since the British did not want early American inference
with their plan. Why Macmillan claimed the direct opposite to Murphy came from
Macmillan’s distorted view of the Anglo-American relationship, and how he
independently sought for the crisis to play out. A committed Americophile, Macmillan
truly believed if push came to shove, the United States would support military action
against Egypt by their British ally. Writing in his memoirs Macmillan expressed as much,
“I was confident that if and when the moment for action arrived we should have, if not
the overt, at least the covert sympathy and support of the Government and people of the
United States.”230 Longing to see the two Atlantic powers united as they were during
World War 2, he refused to comprehend that Anglo-American relations stood at
loggerheads over Suez. Naively believing the complete opposite of Lloyd, that the U.S.
would never seek to interfere with Musketeer, Macmillan attempted to gain immediate
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American support from Murphy by falsely stating that a British invasion of Egypt was
imminent.
If still perplexed where the British stood on military action over the crisis,
Murphy, after sitting down with the prime minister on July 31, received a better
indication of how things were progressing. Unlike the earlier cable to Eisenhower, where
Eden eluded to a possible joint Anglo-American military action against Egypt, the
Englishman gave no indication that he expected -- or sought -- any direct armed support
from the United States. However, like Macmillan, he foresaw no U.S. attempt to impede
such action. Writing in his memoir, Murphy recounts that at their meeting:
There was a confident assumption, however, that the United States would go
along with anything Britain and France did. As Eden expressed it, there was no
thought of asking the United States for anything, ‘be we do hope you will take
care of the Bear!’ A neat way of saying that Britain and France would take care
of the Egyptians, but in case of intervention by the Russian Bear, it was
anticipated that the United States would step in. It seemed to me that Eden was
laboring under the impression that a common identity of interest existed among
the allies. That was not the American view, and I gave no encouragement to the
idea. 231
During this conversion with Anthony Eden, all equivocation evaporated in Murphy’s
mind; he writes, “It became increasingly evident that there was serious and perhaps
imminent prospect of Anglo-French military action.”232 Attempting to retard any
intervention, Eisenhower urgently sent John Foster Dulles to London for further talks and
rapidly drafted a personal message to Eden.233 In the communiqué, the American
president told the British prime minister, that Murphy had informed him of, “your
decision to employ force without delay or attempting any immediate and less drastic
steps.”234 Eisenhower cautioned, “I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my
conviction that some such method must be attempted before any such action such as you
contemplate should be undertaken.”235 He goes on to state, “I have given you my own
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personal conviction . . . as to the unwisdom [sic] even of contemplating military force at
this moment.”236 The message was clear, yet for Eden not clear enough.
To his determent, Eisenhower did not categorically repudiate the non-direct
support Eden sought from the United States -- such as America checking any Russian
involvement. Echoing Murphy, Eisenhower again repeated that without Congressional
approval he could not send in America forces. However, the president did not absolutely
discount the possible need for military action; the phrase “if unfortunately the situation
can finally resolve only by drastic means” in the message left much wriggle room.237
Plainly, in Eden’s estimation, Eisenhower wanted a peaceful solution to the crisis, but if
one proved impossible or maybe just improbable, the American was willing to put the
option for armed intervention back on the table. In many respects, the message just
confirmed the opinion Eden held of the American position already: that the U.S. would
not directly intervene militarily, and favored “attempts” at public negotiation before the
British and French started shooting. With the meetings with Dulles in London, this
estimation did not change, but through the American Secretary of State’s blunt language
only intensified.
Although Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles held an adversarial relationship
for many years, with Dulles arrival to London, the British Empire seemingly found a
welcomed ally.238 Speaking to U.S. Secretary of State on August 1, Harold Macmillan
clearly explained that this “game” for the British was not one they could afford to lose
and, “it was a question not of honour only but of survival.”239 Dulles responded with
appropriate alarm. In a meeting with his long-time rival on the same day, the American
suggested to Eden that an international conference of concern parties meet to discuss the
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Canal issue.240 For reasons that will become clear, Eden agreed. Then Dulles expressed
his forthright opinion on the crisis:
A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to
swallow . . . . We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favour the
international operation of the canal . . . . It should be possible to create a world
opinion so adverse to Nasser that he would be isolated. Then if a military
operation had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less
grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately.241
As Eden recalls, “We were encouraged by his statements…Nasser must be made, as Mr.
Dulles put it to me, ‘to disgorge.’ These were forthright words. They rang in my ears for
months.”242 Eden than reported to Dulles: that the United States Naval Attaché desired
information about British military preparations. The American, as Eden explains, “replied
that the United States government perfectly well understood the purpose of our
preparations and he thought that they had a good effect.”243 This pronouncement was just
more music for the prime minister’s ears. However, unlike what Eden longed to believe,
Dulles sincerely expected diplomatic measures to foil Nasser.244 As Dr. Scott Lucas
argues, “Dulles had not given Eden a blank cheque for military action. He merely restated
the American position that preferred covert methods to the overt use of force. However .
. . he fostered the illusion that the US would not oppose unilateral British measures.”245
Hugh Thomas states this type of misunderstanding was purposeful, “Dulles seemed to
agree with British hatred of Nasser when he was with the British,” however, “in the USA
he would publicly talk against old-fashioned colonialism.”246
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As Dulles returned to Washington, the Anglo-American rift over the Suez had
both widened and cemented. These facts were woefully unclear to both the British or
Americans involved. The fundamental differences between the positions held by Eden’s
government and the Eisenhower’s administration were now utterly irreconcilable.
Barring Nasser deciding to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Britain
remained committed to the use of force. However, the United States now formally held
the position that diplomacy through an international consensus was the key to
“disgorging” the Canal from Nasser’s possession. Despite the seemingly sympathetic
words of Dulles to the British, Washington’s approach to using military action against
Egypt stood diametrically opposed to that of London. A day before meeting with Eden,
Dulles stated to the American ambassador to Britain, “The US Government would not be
in sympathy with any attempt to make the Egyptian Government rescind their
nationalization decrees, or to regard them inoperative, under the threat of force.”247 Why
he did not directly relay this to the British government remains a mystery. For through
obfuscation and blustering on the part of Dulles, the split between the allies remained
obscured. While in the July 31 letter from Eisenhower to Eden, the president counsels
strongly against military action, this warning is over-shadowed by Dulles’ rhetoric in his
face-to-face meetings with members of the British government. When selecting which
message to take to heart, that of a cautious Eisenhower or a winking Dulles, it only takes
a simple deduction to pick which one Anthony Eden chose to believe -- and which to
disregard.
As agreed by Dulles and Eden steps were soon undertaken for an international
conference to work toward setting up a practical arrangement of the Suez Canal under a
transnational structure. Scheduled for mid-August in London, twenty-four nations were
invited to participate. These included the remaining states that initially signed the 1888
Constantinople Convention -- the official treaty that prior to Nasser’s seizure regulated
the administration and supervision of the Suez Canal -- in addition to countries that

247

Quoted in Lucas, 151.
65

shipped significant cargo through the waterway.248 Heading into this conference, three of
the principle players of the crisis all welcomed the idea of a forthcoming summit with
pleasure; each with varying motives but the same intractable reason. Eisenhower, Eden,
and Nasser all wanted more time.
Despite the word games Dulles played with Eden, the prime minister understood
the United States disapproved of immediate military action by the British against Nasser.
However since the United Kingdom could not mount an immediate invasion of Egypt,
this attitude did not initially disturb him. Preparations for war remained the primary
objective. On August 2, Queen Elizabeth signed a royal proclamation recalling reservists
to active duty.249 By August 5, two Royal Navy aircraft carriers loaded with 4,000
parachutists and gunners sailed for the Mediterranean.250 While frantic preparations were
underway for Operation Musketeer, the now joint British-French military staff planning
the strike still needed time to set up the logistics and infrastructure for the attack.251
Coordinating and moving the massive amounts of men and equipment for their upcoming
mission stood as a major hurdle. The earliest tentative D-day for Musketeer stood as
September 15.252 In addition to engineering the military end of the operation, Eden also
found it necessary to bolster political support for his proposed endeavor against Nasser.
Although initial political and civic support for immediate action to regain the Suez Canal
was strong across Britain, it did not last. As Anthony Nutting writes, “The spontaneous
reaction of anger on the part of the British public, which followed the nationalization of
the Canal, was now subsiding.”253 By mid-August roughly only 32% of Britons
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supported military action in Egypt.254 Aware he needed to prepare public opinion to
accept the initiation of Musketeer, Eden required an interval to accomplish this feat.
Rightfully believing that Nasser would never participate in a conference held in
London or be willing to reverse his nationalization of the canal, Eden saw no harm in
placating the Americans by taking part in a useless conference. Also by appearing open
to a diplomatic solution, this allowed the British to claim they took the United States’
advice by seeking a peaceful route before engaging in their planned invasion. Without
the capability to strike Nasser quickly, it made sense for Eden to pretend to go along with
the façade that an international symposium could solve the crisis. While all the while,
British-French forces ceaselessly readied for battle.
In Cairo and Washington, the hopes were that the lengthier the crisis continued
without open hostilities, the less chance of them occurring existed. Nasser supposed that
the longer he held the Suez Canal then world opinion would eventually come around to
its new status in the hands of the Egyptians as an accepted fact. In a bid to lessen the
tensions of forcefully taking control of the Canal, the Egyptian president ordered it to
remain open to all shipping and, as Eisenhower writes, Nasser promised, “The freedom of
navigation in the Canal would not be affected.”255 He also started downplaying the part
America held in his decision to take it. In a press conference shortly after July 26, Nasser
maintained that planning for the nationalization of the Suez Canal began long before the
U.S. refused in aiding the building of the Aswan Dam.256 As Mohamed Heikal states,
“Nasser was playing for time, trying to mobilize support for Egypt both in Arab countries
and in the wider world opinion.”257 The Eisenhower Administration, for its part,
calculated that since Britain had not attacked forthrightly -- as Macmillan and Eden stated
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the British Empire might -- then cooler heads were prevailing in London as the crisis
progressed. In essence, the hastily British were taking the consul of the sage Americans.
As the commander of French forces during Suez, Andre Beaufre argues, “Eden drew the
conclusion that, once the conference had assembled, the Americans would support him,
whereas in fact they were playing for time.”258 Heading into the First London
Conference, Nasser continued to work on world public opinion, Eden in completing his
military preparations, and Eisenhower in believing he had made substantial headway with
the British. The lit fuse of the crisis continued to burn towards open conflict.
The First London Conference, launched August 18 and ending on the 23,
essentially came to naught. Boycotted by Egypt, the international meeting, in borrowing
a Shakespearean term, was simply a lot of sound and fury signifying little -- thanks in
very large part to the United States. “The conclusion,” as Rab Butler wrote in his
memoirs, “of the conference agreed to by eighteen of the twenty-two – that an
international board representing the maritime powers and Egypt should manage the canal
– had to be taken to Nasser.”259 Headed to lead the delegation to Cairo was the Prime
Minister of Australia Robert Menzies.260 As historian David Nichols ventures this
Menzies mission “was almost certain to fail. Why would Nasser, his prestige so enhanced
by his seizure by his seizure of the Suez Canal, accept an agreement that would
effectively return authority over its operation to the British and French?”261 It seemed -at least to the British -- that at the very least only a viable and real threat of force could
potentially achieve this huge capitulation on the part of Nasser. Nevertheless, the
conference never broached the explicit threat of force towards Egypt if the nation rejected
its proposal. However, still with the diplomatic backing of the eighteen powers of the
London Conference in addition to the growing concentration of Anglo-French forces at
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the likely staging area of Cyprus, a pressured Nasser might have agreed to the Menzies’
offer. It was either that or the invasion he knew Anthony Eden truly desired. Yet the
words of two prominent Americans totally dashed any slim chance of this nonviolent
resolution to the crisis from succeeding.
On August 28, during a press conference, John Foster Dulles, speaking on the
crisis as a whole remarked, “This is not a matter which is primarily of U.S. concern but
primarily of concern to the many countries whose economics are vitally dependent on the
Canal.”262 It stood as a public hand washing by Dulles even Pilate would have envied.
Speaking to the American press two days after the arrival of the Menzies mission in
Cairo, Eisenhower completely and unconditionally disallowed any possible use of force if
Nasser rejected the eighteen-nation plan. The American president stated that, “For
ourselves, we are determined to exhaust every possible, every feasible method of
peaceful settlement . . . We are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute,
nothing else.” In a message from Eden to Eisenhower on August 29, the British prime
minister privately rebukes this type of sentiment to the American president by declaring,
“It is our intention to proceed with our plans unless Nasser can be seen clearly and
decisively to have given in.”263 However, this firm stance by Eden did not stop
Eisenhower from uttering only three days later that the Menzies’ mission was in the eyes
of the United States a toothless dragon.
Winthrop Aldrich, the then U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain later remarked,
“Eisenhower cut the bottom right out of the thing by saying publicly, while Menzies was
down there, that it never had been his intention to have force used at all . . . That was the
ball game. It made it impossible for Menzies’ mission to have any success at all.”264
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Unsurprisingly it did not. After Menzies arrived for talks with the Egyptian leader on
September 3, Nasser appeared to have little intention of coming to an equitable
understanding with the Australian Prime Minister. Stating he would only meet during the
evenings Nasser said, “Mr. Menzies it looks as if I may have a war on my hands and in
the morning I must be preparing for it.”265 Nasser, a shrewd strategist, clearly understood
the direction of the prevailing fury coming from London and Paris. During this first day
of talks, Menzies warned Nasser that if he did not comply with the proposal than force
might have to be used. However, after the reveal of Eisenhower’s pacifist-like remarks
of the prior day in the Egyptian newspapers, the tiny chance of a fruitful dialogue went
squarely out the window.266 As Menzies himself makes clear. In his autobiography the
Australian writes, Eisenhower’s statement signaled to Nasser that, “the possibilities of
force could be ignored, since he would naturally assume that force would not be
employed against the will of the United States.”267 And as Menzies adds, “he could reject
our proposals, knowing that if he rejected them quite strongly America would be casting
about for new proposals which . . . would need to be more favorable to Egypt.”268 As the
Menzies’ mission departed Cairo on September 9 in utter failure, the British -- still
determined to force Nasser’s hand -- attempted to play their next card. Yet again, the
Americans, not the Egyptians, were the ones to trump it.
Even before the failure of the Menzies’ mission in early September, the British
were planning to take their case for Egyptian regime change to the United Nations.269 In
his August 29 message to Eisenhower, Anthony Eden floated the idea to the American
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president.270 Looking to legitimize his impending invasion, Eden writes to Eisenhower
that if Nasser refuses the eighteen-nations proposal then, “the balance of advantage lies in
our taking the initiative in raising the matter in the Security Council immediately after a
negative reply from Nasser.”271 Asking for American support for this action, Eden
continues, “I cannot emphasize too strongly that your active help to the success of this
plan.”272 Alluding to the actual reason for this measure he writes, “The plan might pay a
dividend with regard to Nasser’s reactions but the main objective would be to put us in
the best possible positive internationally in relation to the action we may obliged to
take.”273 Also with massive amounts of British and French men and arms arriving in
Cyprus, Eden estimated that a concerned third-party, namely the Soviet Union, would
raise the issue in the Security Council. Hence he wanted to beat the communists to the
punch. As Eden writes in his memoirs, “The French and ourselves were determined that
an appeal to the United Nations must be firmly based on the two conditions.”274 The first
that no agreement be accepted by the U.S., France, and the U.K. short of the eighteenpower proposal and second, “that together we should resist any move by less friendly
powers to limit our freedom of action.”275 If an Anglo-French plan along these stated
lines passed into a U.N. Security Council resolution, it granted Eden an official stamp of
approval in taking out Nasser with force. The Americans saw this as a tipping point. If
such a resolution came to a decision of the Security Council then in front of the entire
world, it would force the U.S. to declare publicly on whose side they stood; either with
their trusted ally or an upstart dictator. That stood as a decision Eisenhower wanted to
prolong as long as he could.
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While the Americans dragged their feet about the prospect of the British and
French taking their case to the United Nations, Dulles hatched a plan later entitled the
Suez Canal Users Association or SCUA.276 Journalist Donald Neff writes, “While Eden
and Mollet searched desperately for an internationally acceptable pretext to go to war
with Egypt, Dulles applied all his formidable energies and legal prestidigitation to
sidetrack them.”277 SCUA, a proposed international body to govern the Canal alongside
Egypt, was for Dulles and Eisenhower a means to restraint the British and French from
both arguing their side to the United Nations and also from preceding to invade Egypt -the real goal of the two European powers. Historian Huge Thomas calls this planned
Users’ Association, “Dulles’s (sic) most masterly scheme of evasion.”278 While Eden and
the French Prime Minister Mollet Guy had their doubts about it accomplishing anything,
they had their own reasons for going along with talks over SCUA.
As the deadline loomed for the September 15, the launch date of Musketeer, the
time frame of the planned operation looked more and more unfavorable to the British. As
world public opinion settled, Eden now believed that a pretext, more than just the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, was required for his planned invasion of Egypt to seem
somewhat justified in the eyes of the international community. Since July 26, Nasser had
allowed all French and British shipping through the Canal and even tolerated these
vessels refusal to pay their tolls to the Egyptian government -- the two nations, in an act
of defiance, continued to make payments for their usage of the waterway to the old Suez
Company.279 Also instead of flatly refusing to meet the Mezines mission, Nasser
graciously listened to their proposals and at least seemed amenable to a peaceful solution.
276
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These signs of reasonable action were not the kind that Britain and France found useful
when attempting to paint Nasser as a new Hitler or Mussolini. A more clear-cut casus
belli for the British, if not the French, who were uncaring on the subject of world opinion,
needed finding. Ever wise to the fact Nasser stated, “The British and French are going to
stay out there in the Mediterranean until they find a pretext to come in.”280
Furthermore, the objectives and logistics of Musketeer remained problems for the
September 15 timetable. Initially planned as an all-out attack on Egypt, the preliminary
directive called for a landing at Alexandria.281 Philip Ziegler writes this strategy, “made
it inevitable that an armed amphibious assault in a densely populated area would be
preceded by massive bombardment by sea and air.”282 With such a substantial attack, the
civilian casualty rate stood to rank in the thousands or possibly in the tens of
thousands.283 Even the military leadership balked at these figures, “As the details were
worked out, the planners themselves became more and more aghast at what they were
proposing.”284 On the behest of the Commander-in-Chief of Middle Eastern Land
Forces, General Charles Knightley, who the British government charged to lead the
attack against Egypt, the original plan for Musketeer was ordered restructured.285 In this
revised attack-plan, the landing for the assault changed from Alexandria to Port Said with
the retaking of the Suez Canal as the now initial objective.286 However, the marching
orders of “Musketeer Revise” still held after the securing of the Canal Zone the Anglo280
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French forces redirecting their attack towards Cairo with the ultimate goal of ousting
Nasser.
By mid-September to the chagrin of the Conservative Government, the glorious
armed forces of the British Empire were still unprepared to tackle the Egyptian armies of
Gamal Nasser. Having less to do with the combat-readiness of the British fighting men,
the problem laid in the still nagging one of logistics. The June abandonment of the
massive complex of military bases in the Canal Zone left Eden to stage his upcoming
invasion of Egypt from the island of Cyprus. However due to inadequate airfields and
harbors on the island in mid-September the RAF and the Royal Navy forces were divided
between there and Malta. Extensive refitting of these facilities were still underway by
mid-September. Keightley and Mountbatten needed more time in order to finish these
improvements so they could muster their forces for a necessary coordinated attack. From
early September on, Eden, on the counsel of both his political and military advisors, kept
pushing the date for Musketeer, and later Musketeer Revise, back. With the buildup of
the Anglo-French military forces in the Mediterranean evident to both his domestic and
foreign critics, Eden soon faced an undesirable choice. He needed to order the invasion,
ready or not, or call the whole thing off. The presence of mounting internal and external
political pressure and the racketing of tensions caused by the gathering of such a large
armed force demanded that current situation could not go on indefinitely. Backed into a
corner, Eden found himself in a precarious position. If he refused to attack Egypt and
through negotiations backed by the Americans, Nasser held onto to the Canal then Eden’s
government was certain to fall. Historian Jonathan Pearson writes, “By the 13
September, Eden found himself under intense pressure both from the opposition and from
a split in his own party.”287 Now war or the return of the Suez Canal stood as the only
options. With Nasser standing firm on retaining his prize, the British prime minister
badly needed a pretext for his invasion -- time, once his welcomed friend, now ticking
against him.
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On September 14 the European pilots who steered the ship through the 120-mile
length of the Suez Canal collectively walked off the job.288 Due to the complex and
challenging nature of circumventing the Canal, trained navigators needed to helm the
boats on their journey through it. Prior to July 1956, few Egyptian nationals held this
occupation and the vast majority of these pilots were either French or British. After
nationalization of the Canal, through the combination of the necessity to kept the seaway
open and the refusal of Nasser to let these men quit, these Europeans had stayed at their
post. But on orders of Eden to the Suez Canal Company, this all changed. Believing that
the Egyptians were incapable of the difficult task of navigating the waterway, he
concluded without the assistance of the mostly British and French pilots then shipping
would ground to a halt through the channel. With the Suez Canal inoperable the precious
supply of Middle Eastern oil had no way of reaching Western Europe. Just the excuse for
the British to retake the Canal for the common good of Europe; it was a pretext that even
the U.S. might find acceptable. However, this latest venture by Eden failed and even
backfired.289 Nasser, who wisely foresaw this potential British provocation, had been
busy ordering the training of Egyptian pilots just for this eventuality. In most cases, they
filled the positions of the departing Europeans without a hitch.290 To the fury and
wonderment of Eden and Mollet, the Canal remained open, and its productivity and
efficiency even increased.291 This episode showed to the world that despite British and
French protests the Suez Canal laid in capable hands with Gamal Abdel Nasser.
On September 19 a second London Conference convened consisting of the
eighteen nations that signed off on the Menzies mission. The creation of the so-called
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Suez Canal Users’ Association was the agenda of the meeting. The intention of SCUA,
at least in the selling of it to the British by the Americans, was to form an international
organization to manage the Canal by hiring its pilots and collecting its tolls. Otherwise, as
Eden viewed it, “to convoy ships of its members through the canal if the Egyptians
refused or proved unable to do so.”292 However, as agreed by almost everyone involved
in the crisis through hindsight, it had a more clandestine raison d'etre in the mind of it
actually creator, Dulles. Eden’s optimistic attitude on the potential usefulness of SCUA
did not last long.
Even before the gathering of its participants, Dulles cut the floor directly from
under SCUA. On September 13, during a press conference the American secretary of
state declared that in the view of the United States the forthcoming User’s Association
had no authority to use military force against Egypt if Nasser did not comply with the
terms of its arrangement.293 He further added that the organization was strictly a
volunteer body that could not require its individual members to follow SCUA’s
mandates.294 These utterings by the American left SCUA as nothing more than a paper
tiger. The credit for why the British ever agreed to host or participate in a conference
setting up such a meaningless association must go directly to Dulles. Although the
American actually thought up the notion of SCUA, Dulles nevertheless convinced Eden
to announce it to the world as a British proposal. Still tendered to the idea after the
Americans categorically refused to support its rulings with military force, the U.K. had
no choice but to follow through with the Second London Conference and hope for the
best. By the first days of the meetings, it appeared they were expecting too much.
Remarking on this merited frustration, Anthony Eden writes, “It became clear to us only
gradually that the American conception of the association was now evolving so fast that it
would end as an agency for collecting dues for Nasser.”295 Anthony Nutting described
the United States’ position of a voluntary nature for SCUA as meaning, “the User’s Club
292
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would do no more than crystallize the status quo and would not be empowered to bring
any further pressure on Egypt.”296 To Eden and his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd it
became obvious the route envisioned by Dulles for SCUA was a ruse from stopping the
British and French from acting in their best interests (i.e. invading Egypt). The
conference ended on September 21, with nothing accomplished except scheduling yet
another conference for October 1, for the opening of the now christened Suez Canal
Users Association. Sick and tired of Dulles’ time-wasting maneuvers and in
contradiction of the wishes of the United States, the British and French petitioned their
case against Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on September 23.297 True to
form, Eisenhower refused to sponsor the proposed resolution, leaving the Eden and
Mollet to go it alone.
On October 13, after ten days of discussions on the issue, the Security Council,
through the veto of the Soviet representative, rejected any direct action against Egypt
under a United Nation’s banner.298 “There was no on in that room at the United
Nations,” Eden states, “at the conclusion of the vote, who supposed for an instant that any
life was left in the work of the London Conference.”299 The countless hours spent in both
international conferences and meetings at the United Nations garnered nothing for Eden
in his duel against Nasser. Time for action was at hand, and with the Americans
steadfastly refusing to do anything but delay, the British opened to an intriguing offer
made by the French.
Unlike the United States, Great Britain found a faithful ally during the crisis in the
nation of France. Reminiscent of the world wars, the Anglo-French alliance stood
throughout the events of 1956 cemented in stone. With no vacillating, the French rallied
from the start to the cause of their European neighbor. Andre Beaufre, the commander
of the French expeditionary forces for Suez, recounts, “As early as 31 July Colonel Prieur
of the Army Staff went to London to announce the colour of the French money: France
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was ready to commit two divisions to Egypt.”300 Only just a day before Prieur’s offer the
country’s Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, matched any of bellicose rhetoric originating from
the other side of the English Channel. Labeling Nasser a “would-be dictator,” Mollet
decried the Egyptian leader as a Hitler imitator.301 Alongside their British allies, the
nationalization of the Suez Canal stood as an intolerable act for the French
government.302 Just as with Britain, the economic consequences of the potential closure
of the waterway would leave France in dire straits. For the nation, the access of Middle
Eastern oil was a vital necessity. Although state prestige and concern for its perception
as a world power mattered to the Mollet government, it never factored into their decisions
during the crisis as much as it did to the British. However, another dynamic urgently
pushed France for the overthrow of Nasser.
Mired in a bloody guerrilla war against Arab nationalists in Algeria since 1954,
the French believed that a direct link existed between this conflict and the Suez Crisis.303
Considered by many French citizens not simply as an overseas colony but an actual
providence of France, Algeria stood as a test of the will of the nation. The red, white and
blue tricolor had flown over the Northern African territory since 1830, but by 1956, the
cities and towns of the region were erupting into full-fledged warzones in a bid to tear it
down. Unlike the retreat from Indochina in 1954, the battle to hold on to Algeria -where over one million Pied-Noirs (French-descendent inhabitants) were fighting for
their homes and businesses -- was to the French very personal.304 Much of the finger
pointing from Paris for the unrest and violence in this North African providence pointed
towards Cairo. Mollet considered Nasser as the number one instigator and prime
supporter for this nationalist insurrection speared headed by a group calling themselves
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the National Liberation Front (FNL).305 As Diane Kunz states, “By striking at Nasser
would deny the FLN material support and would help assuage the growing feeling of
impotence engendered by the peculiarly destructive nature of guerrilla war.”306 With
Nasser deposed the French government could cut off Egyptian backing towards the Arab
nationalists within its own borders. Arguing this point, the Resident Minister in Algeria
stated, “One French division in Egypt is worth four divisions in North Africa.”307 As
with Eden, Mollet viewed the crisis as more to do than just the control of the Suez Canal;
the Frenchman saw an opportunity to rid his citizens of the most vocal and active
international champion for Algerian independence -- Gamal Abdel Nasser.308 By midOctober, through the stringent urgings of the powers-that-be in Paris, France brought
another interested party into Eden’s anti-Nasser coalition, one that radically altered the
entire dynamic of the Suez Crisis.
France not bound to any so-called special relationship cared quite a bit less in
placating the U.S. or attempting to garner American support during the crisis than its
British ally. As early as July 31, after Robert Murphy in London refused to support
armed intervention, Mollet already began feeling the sense that America had abandoned
France.309 Even at that early of a date, a covert meeting had taking place with another
close ally, who the French trusted not to shrink from what needed doing. Unbeknownst
to either the British or the Americans, French military officials on July 29 had initiated
contingency planning with Israel for a possible joint attack against Egypt. 310 A long-time
supplier of arms to Israel, by 1956 France considered the Jewish state one of its closest
allies. The same about Israel could not be said concerning the United Kingdom. Only
eight years prior, the British Empire fought a bloody guerrilla war against the same men
who now governed Israel. In addition, Anthony Eden -- despite his troubled dealings in
305
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the Middle East -- considered himself an Arabist and believed his nation’s duty remained
to lead, if not rule, the Arab world. His adamant backing in forming the Baghdad Pact is
a perfect example of this sentiment. During the crisis the British kept Israel
diplomatically shut off from any involvement in dread of negative Arab reaction such
participation would engender.311 However, numerous times between July and September
both Mollet and the French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau prodded the British to
include Israel in their war planning for Operation Musketeer.312 Fearing how this
involvement would appear to both the Americans and the rest of the world, Eden
categorically refused such a provocative measure. Nevertheless, by the middle of
October, with the unaltered political climate and the desperate need to act least every fell
apart, the British prime minister opened to the idea of a covert arrangement with the
Israelis. With the once wartime ally, Eisenhower, refusing to support him, Eden turned to
a former enemy of the British Empire for assistance.313
On October 21, Eden ordered Selwyn Lloyd to undertake a secret meeting on
behalf of the British Government. The next day Lloyd, “announced that he had a heavy
cold and cancelled his existing appointments.”314 Arriving by plane in France, as
described by a companion of Lloyd, the British Foreign Minister was shuffled into a
private home in Sèvres where the French and Israelis were already discussing future
plans.315 In this French villa, the Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion and Mollet
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called on Lloyd to help end the Suez Affair once and for all.316 On direct orders from
Eden, the Englishman readily agreed. The new plan organized by the three nations at
Sèvres held for the Israelis to attack Egypt across their shared border and menacingly
move towards the Suez Canal. After this initial outbreak of hostilities, British and French
military forces, in the ironic guise of peacemakers, were to land -- just as proposed in
Operation Musketeer Revise -- at Port Said and seize the Canal for its “protection.”317
Eden demanded only two concessions from Ben-Gurion and Mollet to his agreement with
this strategy. One, for the Israelis to hit the Egyptians hard -- not to hold back -- and two,
that the appearance of the Anglo-French attack against Egypt kept, by any means, to look
as an interdiction to separate the already warring parties.318 If these conditions could be
met, then Eden believed he had finally found the right pretext for the war he so longingly
sought.319 Unbeknownst to the rest of the world, on October 24 a top-secret document
entitled the Protocols of Sèvres -- signed by French foreign minister Christian Pineau,
Ben-Gurion, and Patrick Dean, an Assistant Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office
-- formalized the collision on the part of the three nations in jointly attacking Egypt. 320
On October 17, just prior to the secret meeting of Sèvres, Britain, now formally
committed to a tacit alliance with France and Israel in invading Egypt, stopped all
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attempts to influence the United States Government over the Suez Crisis.321 Since
receiving a strongly worded message from Eisenhower on September 3, Eden essentially
understood the United States rejected the use of force against Nasser.322 Yet in Anthony
Nutting’s estimation the more Eisenhower warned Eden: “that America and world
opinion would not support him . . . Eden became to conceal his hand from the Americans.
And after the decision to gang up with Israel had been taken, Eisenhower was told
nothing at all.”323 The America president states by late-October, “It looked like the
British had given up . . . . We couldn’t figure out exactly what was happening because, as
I say, finally all communications just ceased between us on the one hand, and the French
and the British on the other.”324 Dulles, in a meeting with his staff, also showed
concerned over this abrupt change noting, “It’s very strange that we have heard nothing
whatever from the British for ten days. We must try to find out what they and the French
are up to.”325 For the first time since the formation of the crisis, Dulles and Eisenhower
were totally out of the loop in regards to the pending actions of their British allies.
Although American intelligence reported increased mobilization by the Israelis military,
the U.S. could not decipher which neighbor of the Jewish state these bellicose actions
were intended for -- Jordan, Syria, or Egypt.326 Totally in the dark, the Eisenhower
Administration, in the throes of a presidential election battle and worried by a brewing
crisis in Hungary, hoped for the best.
Also hoping for the best in the fading days of October 1956 was Anthony Eden.
Although much criticism had since been lobed at him for deciding to take the path of
321

Walker, 160; Anthony Nutting writes, “From the moment when Eden decided
to go along with the Franco-Israeli conspiracy, the most elaborate precautions were taken
to preserve absolute secrecy, even to the point of misleading our friends and ‘enemies’
alike…Nobody was kept more completely in the dark than the President of the United
States.” Nutting, 110.
322
BNA PREM 11-1177.
323
Nutting, 110.
324
Oral history interview with Dwight Eisenhower, conducted by Philip A.
Crowe, Dulles Oral History Project, located at Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
325
Quoted in Murphy, 388.
326
DDE, White House Central Files (confidential File), 1953-61 Subject Series
Box No. 82, Suez Canal Crisis, Folder 1.
82

“collusion,” by that time Eden held very few cards left to play. While some historians,
like Johanthan Pearson in his book Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant
Gamble (2003), argue Eden folded to intense pressure from the French to conspire with
their Israeli allies, it is hard to conceive that it took a lot of arm squeezing to get the
British Prime Minister to join in an alliance against his arch-enemy Nasser. Having
exhausted all attempts to earn American support for military action, he needed a
resolution that excluded the direct involvement of the United States. With tens of
thousands of British servicemen overseas anxiously waiting for the word to attack, and a
political situation deteriorating daily, Eden’s creditability and political survival stood on
the line. If he withdrew the British military without any meaningful concessions from
Nasser, Eden’s government would undoubtedly fall. And if the numerous conferences,
meetings, and diplomatic missions proved anything it was Nasser persisted in steadfastly
keeping the Canal unless forced to disgorge it. With the refusal of Eisenhower even to
seriously contemplate meaningful economic sanctions or the use of force, the situation
became an effective stalemate. Each side were sticking to their guns, but only Nasser’s,
through his holding of the Canal, were loaded. Unlike at the beginning of the Suez
Crisis, when time seemed firmly on the British side, now, with Dulles numerous delaying
tactics taking their toll, it was quickly running out. Collusion, as the critics of the
Protocols of Sèvres have called it, stood for Eden as a way out of all of this malaise.
However, there remained an all-important caveat to this track; American support
of a substantial amount had to materialize for Britain to achieve its goals in this risky
endeavor. While certainly Eisenhower, and to a lesser degree Dulles, denounced any
attempt for Britain to resolve the Suez Crisis by armed intervention, to what extent were
they serious remained in Eden’s estimation debatable. Once bullets started flying how
could the United States abandon one of its closest allies. In effect all the British needed
was the tacit backing of their Atlantic partner -- not direct military assistance Support in
the United Nations, help with keeping the Soviets at bay, and most importantly access to
North American oil if the Canal became inoperable. All critical needs to the British, but
only limited liabilities to the Americans. Heading into the last week of October, Eden
gambled that when push came to shove the United States -- while unhappy about being
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placed in such a precarious position -- would ultimately support their English-speaking
cousins.
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CHAPTER V
A VERY BRITISH GAMBIT
(October 29 – December 22)
“The British Cabinet certainly made a profound miscalculation as to the likely reaction in
Washington to the Franco-British intervention.”327
-Harold Macmillan from his memoirs
“Those who began this operation [the British and the French] should be left . . . to boil in
their own oil.”328
-Dwight Eisenhower remarking on the unfolding crisis on October 30, 1956
On October 29, 1956, to quote the words of poet John Milton, all hell broke loose.
As according to plan, David Ben-Gurion commenced Operation Kadesh -- an aggregated
invasion of the Sinai Peninsula.329 Under the cover of nightfall, aircraft of the Israel
Defense Force (IDF) dropped an airborne brigade near the strategic Mitla Pass, only 31
miles from the Suez Canal.330 As the vanguard of paratroopers, “were digging in on the
Mitla heights, two armoured columns crossed the frontier and started their dash across the
desert, sweeping aside the small Egyptian detachments in their path.”331 Initially the
motive for the Israeli attack was a complete mystery to Nasser and his closest advisors.
The IDF forces racing across in a mad sprint towards the Suez made no sense to the
Egyptian military staff; it left the Israelis open to both aerial bombardment and a cutting
off of their lengthening supply lines. Oddly, Nasser assumed that “the only plausible
explanation offered was that Israel now believed Britain and France to be on the point of
327
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reaching a settlement with Egypt, so the crisis was over, and a frustrated Israel was trying
to settle its own private scores with Egypt in a hurry.”332 By mid-morning on Tuesday,
October 30, the erroneousness of this scenario dissipated when reports reached Nasser of
RAF reconnaissance aircraft spotted over the Suez Canal.333 The astute Egyptian
president now fully recognized the prearrangement of the situation.
As news reached America of the Israeli invasion -- unlike the bewilderment of the
Egyptian government -- the first thoughts of both Dulles and Eisenhower turned to
possible involvement by Britain and France. On first hearing of the attack, Dulles in an
effort to “smoke them out and see where they stand” called for an audience of the British
and French ambassadors.334 Conspicuously neither was available for consultations. In a
meeting later that day with the president, Dulles stated that the U.S., “must expect British
and French intervention. In fact, they appear to be ready for it and may even have
concerted their action with the Israelis.”335 Writing in Waging Peace (1960), Eisenhower
notes, “Some at the meeting speculated that the British and French might be counting on
the hope that when the chips are down, the United States would have to go along with
them, however much we disapproved.336 Then he chilly adds, “But we did not consider
that course.”337 By the evening of the 29, Eisenhower decided that the best recourse for
the United States was to introduce a resolution in the United Nations condemning the
Israeli attack and calling them to withdrawal immediately from Egyptian territory. In a
meeting that night between Henry Cabinet Lodge, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., and
his British counterpart, Pierce Dixon, the Americans received their first true indication on
how the government of the United Kingdom stood on the evolving situation. Eisenhower
in a telegram to Eden dated October 30 recounts the event. As Eisenhower writes, Lodge
requested Dixon to support the upcoming American resolution in the United Nations
332
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denouncing Israel’s aggression in the Middle East.338 On Dixon’s reaction, Eisenhower
tells Eden, “We were astounded to find that he was completely unsympathetic, stating
frankly his Government would not agree any action whatsoever to be taken against
Israel.”339
The next day Eisenhower received a message from Eden expressing no desire to
aid Nasser against Israel and stating Egypt had brought the attack upon itself.340 He
further went on to state, “we cannot afford to see the Canal closed or to lose the shipping
which is on daily passage through it . . . . We feel decisive action should be taken at once
to stop the hostilities.”341 Ending the communiqué the prime minister stated he would
write again that day after meeting with Guy Mollet and Christian Pineau. By midmorning Lodge had introduced the resolution calling for Israel to withdraw its troop from
Egyptian soil to the U.N. Security Council.342 In historic firsts, Britain and France
exercised their veto power against the resolution; then again, when the Soviet Union
introduced a resolution along the same lines.343 Although the vetoes caused an uproar
among the assembled diplomats, to Eden and Mollet, who failed to gain the international
organization’s support earlier in the month, it must have felt like appropriate payback.
Regardless the two men, sans the U.N., were busy issuing their own highly controversial
resolution the very same day.
As agreed upon during the clandestine meeting at Sèvres, the Britain and France
formally interceded into the fray. On October 30, at 4:30 P.M. Eden while addressing the
House of Common announced the issuing of an ultimatum ostensibly directed at both
Israel and Egypt.344 It demanded the two nations ceased military action, withdraw their
forces at least ten miles away from the Suez Canal and allow the occupation of the Canal
338
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Zone by Anglo-French forces, or face immediate attack by Britain and France.345 He
gave a deadline of 12 hours for compliance with his mandate. Eden stated the motive for
these measures “was to separate the belligerents and to guarantee freedom of transit
through the canal by the ships of all nations.”346 However, the mechanics and wording of
the ultimatum gave little doubt of its true intention. With only Egyptian forces in a tenmile radius of the Canal and Nasser still controlling the waterway, the Anglo-French
threat for noncompliance only applied to Egypt. For these reasons, the role of impartial
peacekeepers on the part Eden and Mollet found few credulous believers anywhere in the
world. Nevertheless, both premiers formally received the backing of their respective
legislative assemblies shortly after the announcement of their ultimatum; in the British
Commons Eden received 270 votes to 218, and in the French National Assembly Mollet
garnered a majority of 368 to 182.347 With the die cast, now the only thing left was for
the British to inform their most crucial, yet unapprised, ally -- the Americans.
Fearing U.S. attempts to halt the issuing of the Anglo-French ultimatum, Eden did
not inform Eisenhower until he had already officially announced it to the world. As
promised in an earlier telegram that day, the British prime minister cabled Eisenhower
after his speech to the Commons. In it, he outlined the demands he had already issued
and attempted to excuse his decision in leaving the Americans in the dark on this
action.348 Eden closed with hopes that “after the dust settles there may well be a chance
for our doing a really constructive piece of work together.” Reception of the news of the
two-power ultimatum at the White House was anything but welcoming. Dulles, speaking
to Eisenhower, called it about as “cruel and brutal” demand as he had ever
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encountered.349 The president seethed to an aide, “I’ve just never seen great powers
make such a complete mess and botch of things!”350 Eisenhower fired off a new telegram
to Eden, which the president later categorized as a warning.351 Writing on the current
situation he stated to Eden, “I must urgently express to you my deep concern at the
prospect of this drastic action” and “that peaceful processes can and should prevail to
secure a solution.”352 Clearly, the British prime minister did not comprehend the warning
or just disregarded it. Eden cabled back to Eisenhower later that night his desire to use
parts of the president’s message to justify the British Government’s position in the
ongoing debate over it in the House of Commons.353 To Eisenhower it was almost too
much to comprehend; he fired off a response telling Eden to do, as he liked. Clearly it
would take more than interpersonal messages between head of states to halt the British
from the widening the war.
At dusk the next day, October 31, British aircraft appeared over Cairo. They
delivered with fury the wrath of an Empire finally seeking it revenge. Bombs dropping
across the Egyptian capital specifically targeted airfields and the Egyptian air force. 354
The RAF then turned to knocking out Radio Cairo and dropping millions of leaflets
blaming the Egyptian population in putting their faith in the hands of Gamal Abdel
Nasser.355 These latter planned psychological attacks put the Britain’s role as unbiased
arbiter in jeopardy, but by then it became less of a priority. The immediate goals of
taking out Nasser and regaining the Suez Canal took precedence over maintaining the
349
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now highly dubious pretext for these actions. With other coordinated attacks on the
Egyptian airbases throughout the nation, Britain and France soon gained air superiority
over most of the country. By November 1, as the Anglo-French armada rode anchor off
the islands of Crete and Malta, invasion loomed close. In preparations for hostile
landings, Nasser desperately ordered the bulk of the Egyptian army to withdraw from the
Sinai in order to protect Cairo and instructed the workers of the Suez Canal to prepare for
guerrilla warfare. It seemed certain to him and the rest of the world, nothing was
stopping the British and French from an all-out invasion of his homeland. However, as
the French, Israeli, and British battled the Egyptians, another war flared between Britain
and America. This conflict -- fought out in the trenches of the United Nations, finical
corridors of power, and boiling over to the high seas -- was the one that ultimately saved
the Egyptian dictator from the hands of his embittered enemies.
On the first of November, in a bid to stymie their headstrong allies, the Americans
struck back. In a televised speech, Eisenhower addressed the nation, and the world, over
the Anglo-French bombardment. On air the president made clear, “The United States
was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of
them in advance.356 Distancing the U.S. further from its European allies he added, “As it
is the manifest right of any of these nations to take such decisions and actions, it is
likewise our right, if our judgment so dictates, to dissent. We believe these actions to
have been taking in error.”357 The message was clear to all; Britain and France had acted
alone with no covert or tactic backing by the United States. To cement this fact, the U.S.
again went to the United Nations.
Circumventing the Security Council, where the definite vetoes of Britain and
France terminated any hope of progress, Eisenhower directed Ambassador Lodge to take
the U.S. case for an immediate cease-fire to the General Assembly. Fearful that any
inaction might cause ruin to the foreign policy of the United States, Dulles summed up
the need to press the issue:
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If we are not now prepared to assert our leadership in this cause, then leadership
will certainly be seized by the Soviet Union . . . . For many years now the United
States had been walking a tightrope between the effort to maintain our old and
valued relations with our British and French allies on the one hand and on the
other trying to assure ourselves of the friendship and understanding of the newly
independent countries who have escaped colonialism. Unless we now assert and
maintain this leadership, all of these newly independent countries will turn from
us to the U.S.S.R. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French
colonialist policies.358
As Eden attests, here the Americans succeeded, he writes, “It was not Soviet Russia, or
any Arab state, but the Government of the United States which took the lead in [the
General] Assembly against Israel, France, and Britain.”359 As an emergency session of
the General Assembly convening at 5:00 P.M. on November 1, the cards were clearly
stacked against the British and their allies. In a marathon like Assembly meeting that
lasted twelve continuous hours, finally ending at 4 A.M. the next morning, the British and
French delegates were exposed to almost universal censure and blinding criticism.360 As
Eden described it, “The Assembly was in a mood to punish. The hunt was up after Israel
and the ‘colonial’ powers.”361 Now with the complete absence of any convivial talk
about “disgorging” the Canal from Nasser, Dulles, himself, introduced the resolution
calling on the British to end their anti-Egyptian crusade. The final count had 64 countries
voting for the American resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and only five
rejecting it; these were Britain, France, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand.362 The vote
was devastating to the United Kingdom’s position on the world’s stage.363 Although the
Assembly resolution, unlike a Security Council motion, did not have the weight of an
order, its effectively labeled Britain, alongside France and Israel, as international pariahs
flaunting the established rule of law.
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At dawn on November 2, Anthony Eden found himself in a perilous position.
Since the issuing of the two-power ultimatum and the ensuing air campaign, domestic
disapproval had sharply increased for his government’s policies. By then opinion polls
showed only 37 percent of the British public supported his decision to “take military
action in Egypt.”364 Only two days earlier, on October 31, Eden received the resignation
of his political protégé, Anthony Nutting. Refusing to go along with what he termed
collusion, Nutting effectively gave up his political career to protest Eden’s decision to
join Britain’s lot with France and Israel.365 When accepting Nutting’s notice, the prime
minister optimistically concluded the meeting by saying: “I hope, in spite of all this, that
we shall see something of each other in the future.”366 After the meeting, they never saw
each other again.367 Moreover, in Parliament the tide against intervention in the conflict
continued to rise. Although Eden had substantially won the vote for his ultimatum in the
House of Commons, the divisions for and against fell directly down party lines. Without
the support of Labour the resulting vote, “showed conclusively that Britain was launching
its military action against the expressed desires of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.”368
The now escalating international opposition, spurred on by the United States, only
worsened Eden’s home front troubles. Adding to these difficulties were also multiplying
concerns originating from Britain’s two allies, France and Israel.
Fearing theses mounting pressures might soon break the will of the British to
continue with the agreed upon plan, the French starting baiting their English allies to
launch their invasion forces for Egypt post haste. Beginning with the bombing of Cairo,
Mollet and Pineau lobbied for an immediate follow-up with the landing of their
respective ground troops. The Frenchmen argued if the Anglo-French forces would
coordinate with the Israeli military then a quick and safe landing at Port Said could be
assured. If the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) crossed the Suez and hammered the
Egyptians then Operation Musketeer Revised would assuredly succeed. Eden, fearful of
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the charge of collusion with Israel, refused any attempt to synchronize the two allied
forces. As Keith Kyle states, “France, from the beginning, was engaged in a fighting a
different war from Britain.”369 While Britannia was, “inhibited by her Commonwealth
ties, her ‘special relationship’ with the United States, and that regard for appearances
which both her domestic politics and her record at the UN required,” France only desired
to destroy Nasser and aid their ally Israel caring little in pretexts and perceptions.370
Without the direct aid of Israel in the forthcoming landing, launching immediately after
the start of the air campaign stood as a risky proposition.
Once Nasser understood the three-power dynamic of the attack against him, he
had ordered the Egyptian army to the west side of the Suez Canal, the side British and
French sought to land and then fight towards to Cairo.371 Also, with negotiations in the
General Assembly reaching a fever-pitch on November 1 and 2, the idea had been batted
around that a United Nations peacekeeping force should intercede in the ongoing conflict.
The British believed that their yet unengaged ground troops could take up that banner if
the premeditated invasion fell apart. After the debacle during the fight over the ceasefire
resolution at the United Nations, Eden rightfully held doubts that the original secret
Sèvres scenario remained workable. Although still committed to landings at Port Said,
the British sought cover for their invasion; but the French were still not entirely
convinced. They saw capitulation in the ranks. Speaking of Eden, Pineau remarked he
“is no Churchill. He has neither the tenacity nor the steel of nerves. The test, instead of
strengthening him, exhausts him. It is not yet a ‘breakdown,’ but we are not far from
it.”372 This coming breakdown originated from attempting to please everyone and
pleasing no one. No matter how much talking, explaining, or pleading with Eisenhower
and Dulles these Americans were standing firm: no military solution from the outset and
now since the bombing campaign only an immediate ceasefire. Bound by honor to the
Sèvres agreement and his own convictions, Eden refused to shift in accepting these
demands. Finally, bowing to French pressure, the British set a date for the D-day of the
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invasion. On November 5, gunpowder and plot -- albeit not treason -- were finally
coming to fruition.
On November 4, in the ongoing mêlée to halt the war, another resolution passed
the General Assembly calling for the U.N. to introduce a police force into the Middle
East within forty-eight hours. It passed in a 55-0 vote. The American supported
resolution, “established a United Nations command for an emergency international force
to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.”373 Despite this occurrence, in
Downing Street the British prime minister held firm. Now resolved to the landing of
forces, Eden was determined to play out his gambit to the hilt. British and French ships
loaded with men and instruments of war steamed toward the Sinai Peninsula. This
armada found an unlikely opponent on the way to its destination. See Figure Two.

Figure Two: Political Cartoon by Michael Cummings printed in The Daily Express on
May 26, 1957.374
Source: "1957 - The U.S. Sixth Fleet dashes off to -er - ahem - intervene in the Middle
East..." Digital image. A Cartoon History of the Middle East. Accessed April 9, 2016.
http://www.mideastcartoonhistory.com
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Right from the beginning of the Suez affair, only one institution in the American
government unwaveringly supported the aims, means, and ways of Great Britain in its
efforts towards solving the crisis. Unlike the politicians they served and advised, the
leadership of the United States military stridently wanted the British to succeed. In a
memorandum of July 31 to the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended that if necessary to regaining “the Suez Canal under a friendly and
responsible authority” the U.S. should take military action in support of Britain.375 Also
on the same day, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke declared in a
National Security Council meeting that, “the JCS are of the view that Nasser must be
broken . . . . We should declare ourselves in support of their [the British] action.”376
Ironically, granted under direct orders from civilian authority, Burke’s actions months
later were diametrically opposed to this recommendation. With the Israeli invasion of the
Sinai on October 29, the American State Department began issuing evacuation orders to
all U.S. citizens in Egypt. To help with this withdrawal Burke ordered the U.S. Sixth
Fleet to take position off the coast of Egypt. Two days later as the British and French
entered the fray, the commander of the Fleet, Vice Admiral Charles Brown, found
himself in a precarious position. With the Royal Navy and the RAF now actively
engaging Egyptian ships, Burke ordered Brown to “prepare for imminent hostilities.”377
When the perplexed Brown responded, “Am prepared for imminent hostilities, but which
side are we on?”378 To the query Burke did not give a direct answer, he only told the
Vice Admiral to, “take no guff from anyone.”379
Understanding the risk of a potentially life-threatening incident with anxious
naval and air forces operating in such a close proximity, First Sea Lord Earl Mountbatten
requested the withdrawal of the U.S. fleet after it completed its evacuation mission; the
Americans demurred. In fact, the actions of vessels and aircraft of the Sixth Fleet seemed
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to invite an incident that so worried Mountbatten. Throughout the days and nights
leading up to the landing of British forces, numerous incidents of harassment towards the
Royal Navy by American armed forces took place.
As an engineer on the RFA (Royal Fleet Auxiliary) Retainer, W. H. Cameron,
recounts, “They kept saying on the BBC news that there was no interference from the
Americans but there was I saw it.”380 “On one occasion we were replenishing HMS
Eagle when an American helicopter hovered about the deck of the Eagle,” Cameron
recalls.381 He continues, “[I]t did not move away until a petty officer rushed to a multiple
Bofors gun and swung the barrels directly on the helicopter which was only a few feet
above it.”382 On another occasion occurring on November 2, the HMS Ulysses reported
she had been, “continuously menaced in the past eight hours by US aircraft, flying low
and as close as 400 yards.”383 In addition, British convoys found themselves utterly
disrupted when American naval vessels blazingly sailed through their lines.384 These
types of harassments were much more than minor nuances. With the British at a wartime
footing, anything might have occurred in response to these reckless actions. The chance
of an American aircraft or vessel being mistaken as hostile Egyptian attacker remained
constant. If direct orders were given for these American measures against the Royal
Navy, they have not yet been discovered or disclosed. Whatever the motive for these
actions, to treat these British servicemen as a plaything while they were entering the fray
of battle just exemplified the American attitude to the United Kingdom at the moment;
especially when it did not fall in line with the will of the United States.
On November 5 at 7:15 in the morning, fifteen minutes after the U.N. Assembly
resolution called for all hostilities to have ceased, British paratroopers landed four miles
west of Port Said.385 Encountering little resistance, they sought to secure the airfields on
the outskirts of the city for resupply and prepare for the landings of the main attack force.
On the same day, Eisenhower received a message from Eden that the Englishman had
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sent the night before. In the letter, Eden, addressing the American president as “Dear
Friend” opened with, “It is with great grief to me that the events of the last few days have
placed such a strain on the relations between our two countries.”386 While showing
remorse for their differences, the prime minister held that the invasion he had ordered
was still justified, “I have always felt . . . that the Middle East was an issue over which, in
the last resort, we would have to fight.”387 “I know that Foster thought we could have
played this longer,” Eden continues, “But I am convinced that, if we allowed things to
drift, everything would have gone from bad to worse.”388 He ended the letter quite
fatefully with, “History alone can judge whether we have made the right decision.”389
Eisenhower contemplated writing back but did not respond; in his estimation, events
were moving too quickly to capture the moment.390 However, another foreign leader did
take the time to write Eden on that fifth of November; and in the keeping with the
tradition of Guy Fawkes, this man promised explosions.
Initiating a bloody and cruel “re-invasion” of Hungary only two days earlier, the
leadership of the Soviet Union openly reveled over the Anglo-America split by
November 5.391 With the Western alliance fractioned over the Suez Crisis, the Soviets
found this the perfect time to quell the anti-Russian sentiment sweeping their once
stalwart Warsaw Pact ally. Unable to coordinate a unified front, and busy working
against each other over affairs in Egypt, the Atlantic alliance did little more than protest
this belligerent act of the Soviet Union. As British and American diplomats and
politicians squabbled, thousands of Hungarians valiantly died. Even more despicable
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was that while the Soviet Union was conducting this vile suppression in Eastern Europe,
the Americans were by default allied with the U.S.S.R in their attempts to impede the
welfare of their closest allies, France and Britain. Writing to Dulles, the American
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen, said as much. “One of the most
disagreeable features of the present situation,” Bohlen stated of the ongoing Suez Crisis,
“is finding ourselves on the same side of this question with the Soviets.”392 In both the
Security Council and the General Assembly, the United States and the Soviet Union
voted alongside each other against the interests of these two vital members of NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Too many, including almost certainly Anthony
Eden, must have viewed this as a world turned upside down.
Secure in his belief that the United States had entirely abandoned the United
Kingdom over the British intervention in Egypt, the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin sent
an alarming letter to Anthony Eden that the Englishman received the same day British
troops engaged the Egyptians. The message is nothing but chilling:
In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked
by powerful states possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon? And
there are countries now which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts
of Britain, but could have used other means, such as rocket technique. We are
filled with determination to use force to crush the aggressors and to restore peace
in the East. We hope you will show the necessary prudence and will draw from
this the appropriate conclusions.393
The threat of nuclear war appeared evident.394 Although Eden did not take the message
literally, it did rattle many in the American Government.395 Without the public splitting
of the Anglo-American alliance, it is hard to conceive Bulganin would have even
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contemplated sending such a menacing warning. However, the Soviets did not stop there,
on the same day in Moscow Ambassador Bohlen received a message from Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dmitri Shepilov for forwarding to Eisenhower.396 As Bohlen
describes, “the note proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union join in a
common action – the implication was military action – if necessary against France and
Britain, America’s two closest allies.”397 White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams
summarizes the communication the same. He states the message proposed that, “Russia
and the United States should form a military alliance to stop the British and French
invasion of Egypt.”398 Although the White House called the proposal “unthinkable” in a
statement on the letter, the mere attempt of such a bizarre proposal only reiterates how
much the United States had left their European allies to twist in the international wind.399
In the predawn darkness of November 6, over two hundred ships waited at battle
stations for sunrise.400 Not far from this massive Anglo-French armada lay around fifty
vessels of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.401 Remaining aloof, the American naval ships, now
finished with their evacuation mission, rode anchor waiting for orders. Kyle Keith
writes, “The long shadow of the Sixth Fleet, the ever-present symbol of American
disapproval, fell ominously across the path of [Operation] Musketeer.”402 If commanded
to stop the invasion the Americans were ready -- but not willing. As Admiral Burke
cautioned the State Department, “We can stop them but we will have to blast the hell out
of them.” 403 He continued, “If we are going to threaten, if we’re going to turn on them,
then you’ve got to be ready to shoot. We can do that. We can defeat them.”404
Thankfully, cooler heads in Washington prevailed; orders soon arrived calling for the
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American Fleet to sail to calmer waters.405 At this critical moment, the Anglo-American
dispute mercifully stayed cold.
With the arrival of first light, the shelling of Port Said began; British troops
landed shortly afterward.406 The moment the Americans, Russians, and Egyptians had
fiercely worked against and fundamentally feared finally arrived; the British lion, despite
their best efforts, roared. Quickly cutting through initial Egyptian resistance, the
vanguard of the expeditionary force was already fighting their way through the streets of
Port Said as the bulk of the Anglo-French forces streamed ashore.407 By mid-day, all the
preliminary objectives were met with the strategic city fully in the hands of the British.
Armor columns thundered through the desert, hell-bent on capturing the entire Suez
Canal.408 Victory seemed assured. Then a little after 1 p.m. (Egyptian time), the
commander of the expedition, General Charles Knightley, received a peculiar order from
London. It changed everything.
From the outset of the crisis, Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
had been one of the most vocal members of the British government advocating military
intervention against Nasser.409 However, by November 6, this viewpoint of the
Chancellor radically changed; seemingly overnight this vicious hawk had transformed
into a callow dove. Throughout the months of September and October 1956, the foreign
dollar reserves of the United Kingdom had fallen to respectively 57 million and 84
million.410 With concern over the potential state of the British economy if the Suez Canal
closed and general investor uncertainty, these losses were in Macmillan’s estimation
405
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“tolerable.”411 However, in the first week of November intense pressure on the sterling
put Britain’s financial well-being into dire straits. Due to the massive selling of the
pound on international markets, the losses to the British monetary reserves estimated in
November “were to be $279 million, if not wholly, in the first few days.”412 This figure
constituted a loss of over one-eighth of their remaining total -- gone in less than a
week.413
A run on sterling seemed inevitable due to the precarious international situation
Britain found itself in, however, the amount of selling points to market manipulation by
an influential group, namely, the American government.414 In his memoirs, Macmillan
speculates that the United States Treasury might have played a hand in this massive
dumping of the pound. He also states, “the selling by the [U.S.] Federal Reserve Bank
seemed far above what was necessary as a precaution to protect the value of its holdings.”
Facing a looming currency crisis or a forced devaluation of the pound, the United
Kingdom needed a massive loan of foreign capital quickly to save its economy from utter
ruin. Sadly, for Britain, America held the purse strings.
Even more troubling to the fate of the United Kingdom, but only just a little less
immediate, was its ability to purchase oil. Even as British land forces rushed to seize the
Suez Canal, their mission, in one aspect, was already a failure. Prior to the Anglo-French
invasion, Nasser already ordered the sinking of numerous ships throughout the waterway,
incapacitating it for the foreseeable future. Even with the speedy capture of the Canal, it
would take the British and French weeks to restore it to working order. In this interval,
the U.K. required petroleum from Western Hemisphere sources. Unlike the Middle
Eastern nations that accepted the pound for oil, the countries in the Americas -- including
the United States -- required payment in American dollars. By November 6, with the
Bank of England bleeding foreign capital in order to keep the pound afloat, the nation
simply did not have the funds to pay for this vital import of oil in dollars. With strategic
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reserves of petroleum running low, it was only a matter of time until the British Isles
ground to a halt.
The British government had two options in attempting to gain the treasuries it
desperately needed. These consisted of either a direct loan from the United States or
withdrawing the British quota from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- money the
U.K. had already paid into the fund.415 On both fronts, Macmillan met stalwart resistance
by the Americans. During a telephone call on November 6, Secretary of the Treasury
George Humphrey told him help would only be forthcoming if the British agreed to an
immediate cease-fire.416 In addition, news reached Macmillan that the U.S. vetoed
British withdrawals from its IMF fund.417 No other avenues were left for Britain to turn
down; point blank the nation needed American financial assistance. Only, as the United
States government made crystal clear, none was forthcoming unless Eden called off the
invasion. With Anglo-French incursion still only hours old, Macmillan, once one of the
firmest advocates for military intervention, headed into a Cabinet meeting on November
6 determined to promote an immediate cease-fire. In the meeting, Eden, now showing
signs of severe physical illness, relented to the inevitable.
Without consulting his French or Israeli allies, the British prime minister ordered
a cessation of hostilities and for an informal cease-fire to begin at midnight November
7.418 Although dissenters in the Cabinet urged for pushing on at all costs, their pleas fell
on deaf ears. While Eden later lamented that maybe he had ordered the armistice too
soon, at the time escalating economic and diplomatic pressure seemed insurmountable.419
In addition, with the British finally bowing to the urgent requests from the United States
for a cease-fire, Eden believed that Eisenhower would now support and protect the
interests of the United Kingdom going forward. Writing on this point, Macmillan states,
“We hoped that the United States would now pursue, if not a friendly, at least neutral and
415
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perhaps even a constructive course.” As he later confessed, he was dead wrong on that
supposition: “We could hardly foresee that the United States Government would harden
against us on almost every point and become harsher after the cease fire than before.”420
On November 6, with the actual fighting coming to a halt, the crucible that Great Britain
endured was not quite over.
Humiliation and abject failure seemed the only penance the Americans were
willing to accept from the British for the failure of their not bending to the expressed will
of the United States during the Suez Crisis. As Macmillan writes, “We were now forced
along a slow retreat on almost every point, accompanied by humiliations almost
vindictively inflicted upon on us at the instance of the United States Government.”421
This anti-British policy of the United States surfaced almost immediately after the ceasefire. Wounds over the crisis ran deep on both sides; however, only the Americans were
in a position to administer immediate revenge.
In a conciliatory phone on the evening of November 7, Eden sought to mend
fences with the newly reelected Eisenhower; the previous day they had spoken when
Eden told Eisenhower about his decision to submit to the U.N. ordered cease-fire.422 The
November 6 conversion had been tense and to the point. Worried about surviving a
forthcoming no-confidence vote in the Commons, Eden told Eisenhower, “If I survive
tonight I will call you tomorrow.”423 In the next day’s exchange, hoping to reinforce the
Anglo-American relationship publicly, the Englishman suggested to the American
president that they meet in Washington for talks in the near future.424 Eisenhower, in a
jovial mood over his day’s overwhelming election victory, readily agreed to such a
meeting. He also urged Eden not to fret over their disagreements for “after all it is just a
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family spat.”425 For Anthony Eden it appeared the road to reconciliation seemed assured.
Yet shortly after the phone conversation, a message arrived stating due to pressing
internal affairs the proposed conference between the two leaders must be postponed
indefinitely.426
Even with an official cease-fire in place, the British still occupied the territory
they had captured from the Egyptians. Eden believed that this continued presence near
the Suez Canal remained the only bargaining chip for his nation in exacting any
concessions for its extremely expensive, but short, military endeavor. Eisenhower found
this position totally unacceptable. Over the forthcoming days, the United States
continually demanded the complete withdrawal of the 22,000 soldiers now positioned in
and around Port Said. Tethering this insistent request with the offer of financial
assistance to the British economy, the Americans effectively sought to blackmail the
United Kingdom into complying with this U.S. stipulation. “The Americans,” Macmillan
states, “not content with the ‘cease-fire,’ were now demanding an immediate
evacuation.”427 He goes on to write, “[Secretary of Treasury] Humphrey made it clear to
me that he would maintain his opposition to any drawing from the International Monetary
Fund or support means of loan, until the British and French troops had left Egypt.”428 As
on November 6, the Americans were again tightening the economic screws to their
European ally.
At the United Nations, the British did not fare any better. In resolutions calling
for the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Sinai Peninsula, America voted
again with the Soviet Union and against the United Kingdom. As Eden writes of his
opinion on this turn of events, “The United States and Soviet Russia joined together in
the General Assembly to issue their instructions on Suez . . . the fact that the United
States and Russia were together did not mean that they were right.”429 However, by then
Eden’s objections or disapprovals mattered little to those holding real power over the
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situation; leverage held by Eisenhower, and now also Nasser, guaranteed the eventual
capitulation of the British position.
Here again, the United Kingdom’s dependence on foreign oil contributed
significantly to its defeat. Eden’s order to halt the invasion prior to British forces gaining
control of the Suez Canal thwarted Anglo-French plans to clear it. After the cease-fire,
seventeen sunken ships and two destroyed bridges still blocked any passage through the
waterway.430 Nasser declared that no attempts to clear the canal would start until all
Anglo-French forces left Egyptian soil.431 Without the reopening of the Suez Canal,
limited access to Middle Eastern oil still left Great Britain needing petroleum from
sources in the Western Hemisphere. Here Eisenhower again did not relent; Eden states,
“The United States would not extend help or support to Britain until after a definite
statement on withdrawal had been made.” 432 Left with little choice, British forces started
withdrawing to bases in Cyprus on December 3. Three days before Christmas, in an
unceremonious departure reminiscent of another only seven months prior, British armed
forces again vacated their presence in Egypt.433 Only then, on December 27, did Nasser
order clearance on the Suez Canal to begin.434 This last defeat ended the Suez Crisis.
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CHAPTER VI
FORTINBRAS RISING
“Far-called, our navies melt away; on dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday, is one with Nineveh and Tyre!”
Rudyard Kipling, Recessional
“A little more than kin, and less than kind”
William Shakespeare, Hamlet
On November 16, as the workings of the British withdrawal from the Suez were
still under way, Selwyn Lloyd visited John Foster Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital in
Washington D.C.435 On November 2, the American Secretary of State, suffering serve
abdominal pains, had admitted himself to the hospital.436 It confirmed the start of one
situation the wily Dulles could not negotiate himself out of; the yet undiagnosed cancer
eventually proved terminal. In the meeting with Lloyd, he appeared friendly to his
British counterpart, but not willing to concede any favorable terms to the Anglo-French
position. Unexpectedly, as Lloyd recounts, Dulles, “with a kind twinkle in his eye,”
asked the Englishman a stunningly blunt question that left Lloyd dumbfounded. Staring
directly at Lloyd, the American asked, “Selwyn, why did you stop? Why didn’t you go
through with it and get Nasser down?”437 Lloyd writes of the moment, “If ever there was
an occasion when one could have been knocked down by the proverbial feather, this was
it.”438 Responding to the query, Lloyd told Dulles, “Well, Foster, if you had so much as
winked at us we might have gone on.”439 To this, Dulles with a smile said he could have
never done that.440
One not reveling in the failure of the British cause due to unrelenting American
pressure was Anthony Eden. Having also taken violently ill, the prime minister on
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November 19 retreated to Jamaica in a bid to recuperate.441 When he returned to Britain,
his days as leader of Her Majesty’s Government were effectively numbered. Unlike
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Dwight Eisenhower, who went on to lead their respective
nations for years to come, Eden paid the ultimate political price for his failure. On
January 9, citing ill health, he resigned in disgrace and was succeeded by Harold
Macmillan.442 However, the stigma of the failure of Suez did not die with the departure
of Eden like Banquo’s ghost it lingered over the British Isles for many years to come.
With Eden quietly exiting stage left, the man who first heeded to American
pressure to halt the Suez invasion now governed Britannia. Walking lock step with the
United States during his premiership, Macmillan kept Britain consistently tethered to the
interests of America. Eden later stated that the foreign policies of his successor relegated
the mighty British Empire to the 51 state of the USA. British historian John Darwin
argues, “The 1960s were a dismal decade for British diplomacy. Despite the boastful
proclamation of Harold Macmillan and his successors that Britain would remain a global
power come what may, the reality was an unbroken diet of humble pie.”443 Macmillan’s
refusal to risk another Suez-like confrontation with the United States over continued
attempts of the British to hold onto their overseas colonies swung the door wide open for
these territories to gain their independence. The “winds of change” Macmillan initiated
swept the Empire almost clearly off the face of the map.444 Without the substantial
leverage of its colonies, a united Europe now seemed an inviting avenue for the British to
venture down.
The day that Eden under American economic pressure ended the invasion, Guy
Mollet -- frustrated over the abandonment of his nation by the U.S. -- found solace in the
words of the Prime Minister of West Germany Konrad Adenauer. The German told
Mollet that a united “Europe would be his revenge;” meaning with the consolidation of
the trading and political powers of the European nations in a collective organization
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America would not be able to run roughshod over France anymore.445 David Reynolds
states, “France’s irritation with NATO and its enthusiasm for a European Community
were both greatly accentuated by the crisis.”446 The idea appealed to many British as
well and undoubtedly influenced their decision to join the European Common Market in
1973. Also, with the specter of Suez firmly imprinted in its psyche, the United Kingdom
found a little molecule of revenge against its American ally. As the war in Vietnam
reached its height in the late 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson sought British military
forces to join in the anti-communist cause.447 Prime Minister Harold Wilson
resoundingly refused.448 The reversal of fortune from 1956 to 1968 for the Americans
only served, in some respects, as fitting justice.
Despite the trauma the Suez debacle played on the British psyche, not all of its
effects lasted endlessly. In 1982, a different dictator sought to “nationalize” the Falkland
Islands. As in 1956, again the British lion roared. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser, the
Argentina Junta did not survive its fury. Like Anthony Eden another Conservative Prime
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, laid the prestige of the British nation on the line; but
contrasting Eden, Thatcher succeeded.

Then in 1990, with the Gulf War, and again in

2004, with the controversial invasion of Iraq, the British army, the Royal Navy, and the
RAF returned to the Middle East to once more do battle with an Arabic tyrant.449
Regarding this last event, many critics of Tony Blair have even made a comparison of his
actions leading up to the Iraqi war with those of Eden’s during 1956.450 The battle scars
of the British disaster at Suez were long lasting, yet as with all things, time had erased -for good or ill -- some of their lingering influences.
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From the earliest days of Great Rapprochement to the Cold War era of the Special
Relationship, Anglo-American relations rested on mutual interests. On the vast majority
of occasions the United States and Great Britain found common cause in their foreign
relations and worked together to achieve a communal goal. Countless battles during the
World Wars attest to this fact. However, when the national advantage of one of these
powers stood opposed to the other, the Atlantic alliance rapidly and unceremoniously
broke down. Here the disputes over Indochina, American challenges to the British
gaining an atom bomb, and the disagreements over China and First Offshore Crisis
confirm this supposition. William Pearson writes, “While tied together by a mutual fear
of Soviet expansionism, it is clear that London and Washington were bound to come into
conflict in the 1950s.”451 With Egypt and the Suez Canal playing such a vital role in the
maintenance of the British Empire, it made logical sense for the Anglo-American
struggle to flashpoint here. As the U.S. government sought to gain allies against the
Soviet Union, Egypt, and its leader Nasser, naturally appeared as prime candidates.
As the crisis heated up, appearances mattered more and more to the United States
and Great Britain. To turn back once the United Kingdom initiated mobilization for a
forthcoming Egyptian invasion would give the impression of failure. Once Anthony
Eden assembled the dogs of war, they needed unleashing; anything less than that reeked
of appeasement. On the other side of the Atlantic, perceptions spurred the United States
to halt its ally at practically all costs. Fearful of labeled a supporter of British colonialism
in the eyes of the world, Eisenhower believed the U.S. needed to stop Eden from
achieving Britain’s goals during the crisis. The events of the second half of 1956 proved
Eisenhower successful. “Looking backward to those days,” the American president
writes of Suez, “it is easy to see that the British and French won battles but nothing
else.”452 On that point, thanks to efforts of himself and his nation, Eisenhower is exactly
right.
An unsentimental review of the Anglo-America diplomacy leading up to 1956, a
stark look at the British position in Egypt, and a recounting of the events of the actual
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crisis proves overwhelmingly that the United States -- for selfish motives -systematically guaranteed the failure of the United Kingdom in achieving its objectives
during the Suez Crisis. The argument is abundantly clear; however, the supposed
justification for the actions of Eisenhower and Dulles might need elaboration. One could
argue that the Americans had a moral duty to prohibit their ally from violating
international law. However, it is difficult to give much credence to this supposition
when examining the historical facts. On this basis, the United States could hardly play
the role of upright protector for national sovereignty. In fact, encroaching into the affairs
of an autonomous nation never seemed to bother Eisenhower prior to the attempt by Eden
to remove Nasser. In the consecutive years of 1953 and 1954, the American government
vigorously pursued and achieved the overthrow of two world leaders they deemed
unsuitable. The Central Intelligence Agency’s participation in regime changes in Iran
and Guatemala cannot be discounted. While it might first seem reasonable to take the
moral high ground in defending the American actions during the Suez Crisis, it is
unfortunately not that black and white.
The story of the Suez is far from having its last chapter written. Writing over
forty years ago, Geffrey Murray bemoaned, “So much has been written about the steep
hill of Suez that anyone presuming to comment after seventeen years is bound to feel a
sense of emptiness on the subject.”453 Times, however, has proven Murray a bit off the
mark. His attempt in closing the book on the historiography of the Suez Crisis remains
premature. Even now in the twenty-first century, the wealth of scholarly and popular
works on the subject grows steadily each year. As the desert winds still swirled under the
blades of departing helicopters taking the last British troops back to Cyprus, Suez began
capturing the imagination of journalists and historians, and that captivation has yet to
diminish. Much of this interest and fascination comes from the cinematic allure of the
crisis to American and British enthusiasts. Numerous commentators have cited aspects
of the affair that rival those of then contemporary spy novels and latter-day techno453
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thrillers. As more and more previously held classified material of various governments
involved in this mystery open to public eyes, layers of the onion peel away. Yet as
increasingly factual documentation is unearthed, it remains a tale with the potential of
morphing into a legend. Not unlike classical works based on actual events, the elements
of a great tragedy are present at Suez.
In the last act of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the titular character takes up arms against
the forces tearing away his birthright and destroying the kingdom of Denmark. Beset by
powerful enemies from the beginning, the prince, after much handwringing, finally seeks
his revenge. In the final scene he gallantly gives his life in this effort, losing everything
but his sense of duty. Anyone only slightly familiar with the story of Hamlet knows
these basic series of events. However, an often forgotten plot point of the play is who
inherits the throne and kingdom that Hamlet sacrifices in order to preserve. For the
pathos of the story, it is but a minor detail; the audience comes for the tale of the “mad
prince” not the political situation left in his wake. Cut from almost all productions of
Shakespeare’s Hamlet is the real foil of the protagonist, Fortinbras of Norway. Heralded
as an imposing leader and a constant danger to the security of the kingdom, the often
forgotten Fortinbras is literally the last man standing as the curtain falls. In
Shakespeare’s original version, directly after the tragic death of Hamlet, Fortinbras,
having done nothing to support or aid the hero, enters and claims Hamlet’s mantle as his
own.
Although Anthony Eden is certainly no Hamlet in the parable, America eases
quite effortlessly into the role of Fortinbras. After the British fiasco at Suez, the United
States effectively took over the mantle of the West in the eyes of the world. As Britain
fought to retain its Anglo-centric Empire, the U.S. at the very least only waited to pick up
the pieces. During the Suez affair the Americans did far worse, there they actively
sought the ruin of British interests. Here a cynical individual might say they actually
played the part of a treacherous Iago over the opportunistic Fortinbras. Granted, the
warning signs were always flashing for Eden and the British. Countless times
Eisenhower and Dulles implored their Atlantic cousins to restrain themselves, but the
ominous messages went disregarded. Yet as the Gotterdammerung of Suez fell upon the
111

British Empire, the American Republic did not lament the flames engulfing their defiant
ally.
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